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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this study is the evaluation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Central Government Departments (CGDs) in Greece. 
Measurements are compared with those defined by the Administrative 
Reform 2013 (AR2013) to assess whether the reforms introduced by the 
AR2013 to the CGDs attain the objectives of efficiency and effectiveness. 
The efficiency and effectiveness measurements of 19 CGDs drew on four 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models (i.e. Variable Returns to Scale 
DEA; Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA; Stochastic DEA; and Quality-
driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA). This analytical methodology does more 
than merely attempt to defend or argue against the AR2013. It rather 
provides a concrete analytical framework for evaluating the 
performance of public organisations across the board, suggesting 
reforms that promote efficiency and effectiveness, and advance 
managerial capacity. 
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Reform of Public Administration in Greece; 
Evaluating Structural Reform of Central 
Government Departments in Greece: 
Application of the DEA Methodology 
1. Introduction 
Governmental activities in the public sector are commonly regarded as 
inefficient by international organisations, such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (Afonso et al., 2010). The reform of 
public administration and, in particular, the improvement of efficiency 
and effectiveness are key priorities for every country (UNDP, 2004). 
Efficient and effective public administration ensures the optimal 
utilisation of the resources engaged by public bodies and also the 
allocation of excessive public funds to the society or to actions for 
boosting the economy. According to the United Nations (UNDP, 2004), 
public administration reform includes changes in the organisational 
structure of public administration, human resource management, and 
public finance, as well as decentralisation, regulatory reforms and 
results-based management. This study emphasises changes in the 
organisational structure of the Greek public administration. 
The reform of the ‘machinery of government’ (e.g. structure of 
ministries and public entities) towards the attainment of efficiency and 
effectiveness is one of the fundamental objectives of the Greek National 
Reforms Programme (2014). This programme highlights the need for 
downsizing the Greek public administration and reducing the resources 
utilised. The reform of the Greek public administration for enhancing 
efficiency is a key recommendation put forth by the OECD (2015). The 
Administrative Reform 2013 (AR2013), which is the most recent reform 
project of the Greek public administration, aims to reform the central 
public administration and, in particular, the Central Government 
Departments (CGDs), by downsizing the structure and reducing the 
number of staff and the budget allocated to every CGD. The objectives of 
the AR2013 underlie the achievement of a more efficient and less costly 
central administration. 
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The efficiency and effectiveness of public organisations are commonly 
measured through certain indicators (Smith and Street, 2005; Poister 
and Streib, 1999; Smith and Mayston, 1987). A limitation of quantitative 
indicators is that they evaluate specific aspects of efficiency and 
effectiveness of public organisations, while providing a high probability 
of conflicting results (Smith and Street, 2005). For instance, a public 
organisation might appear to perform well on the basis of one indicator 
(i.e. the score of the indicator is higher than a threshold value or than 
the previous year’s score obtained from the same indicator), but the 
organisation is disqualified on the basis of another indicator. In this 
context, indicators cannot provide an absolute guarantee for qualitative 
decision-making. 
Among the widely used methodologies for measuring efficiency are the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978) and the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977; 
Aigner et al., 1977). The former methodology is non-parametric drawing 
on linear programming for measuring the relative efficiency of 
operational units. DEA constructs empirical production frontiers 
consisting of relatively efficient operational units. Unlike DEA, SFA is a 
parametric methodology, which takes into account the effect of ‘noise’ 
in efficiency measurement. Unlike DEA, which regards any deviation of 
an operational unit from the frontier as inefficiency, SFA distinguishes 
such deviations between inefficiency and ‘noise’. A crucial difference 
between DEA and SFA is found to be in the construction of the 
production frontier. The latter methodology assumes the form of the 
production function (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, translog) rather than defining it 
from empirical data. 
Drawing on the literature of efficiency and performance measurement, 
DEA is a widely used methodology (Liu et al., 2013; Emrouznejad et al., 
2008). DEA has been applied to various industries, such as banking, 
education, health care and energy (Liu et al., 2013). The applications of 
DEA to the public sector have been so far limited and mainly focused on 
local government institutions (Afonso and Fernandes, 2006; García-
Sánchez, 2006; Worthington and Dollery, 2002; De Borger and Kerstens, 
1996; Smith and Mayston, 1987). All of the applications of DEA to the 
public sector define optimal levels for resources engaged by public 
organisations in order for the organisations to become adequately 
efficient. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that applies DEA to 
measure efficiency and effectiveness of the central public 
administration. This study is in line with the priorities of the Greek public 
administration, namely the improvement of efficiency and the 
attainment of effectiveness of the CGDs, and the significant reduction of 
public spending for the operations of the CGDs. An additional novelty of 
this work is the evaluation of a public administration reform project (i.e. 
AR2013) based on the achievement of efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy. This study applies three DEA programmes to measure the 
efficiency of the Greek CGDs (i.e. Variable Returns to Scale DEA, 
Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA and Stochastic DEA) and a DEA 
programme to measure effectiveness (i.e. Quality-driven Efficiency-
adjusted DEA). Each DEA programme expresses a different perspective 
of efficiency and effectiveness. In this context, the four DEA programmes 
provide a versatile approach to the evaluation of efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Greek CGDs. Ultimately, this study aims to answer 
the following research questions: (1) whether the AR2013 facilitates the 
Greek CGDs to become efficient and effective; (2) whether structural 
reforms in central government affect the quality of governance; (3) 
whether the reduction of the size in CGDs affects positively the 
coordination of policy – related with qualitative aspects such as 
professionalism in the public service, etc.; and (4) whether structural 
reforms in the Greek CGDs need to take place for them to become 
efficient and spend no more than the target budget allocated to every 
CGD by the AR2013. 
This work unfolds as follows: Section 2 highlights aspects of the profile of 
the Greek public administration, reviews public administration reforms 
before the AR2013, and discusses the priorities of the AR2013. Section 3 
presents the four DEA programmes and discusses the variables 
introduced in these to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Greek CGDs. Section 4 analyses the results obtained from the DEA 
programmes, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Reforming the administrative structure 
One of the crucial factors delaying reforms in economy and society in 
Greece is the poor condition of public administration. Namely, the 
administrative system of the country exhibits certain curious aspects and 
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features which are conducive to remarkable weaknesses of performance 
and rather limited capacity of achieving results (Mergos et al., 2012: 195 
ff.). 
Greek bureaucracy has been in such a state of affairs for a rather long 
period of time. Suffice it to mention here that Spyridon Eulamblos, who 
wrote a book in 1894 under the very insightful title Maladministration in 
Greece (he was actually the first Greek author who used this term), was 
even then talking about the crisis of bureaucracy in Greece, its 
deficiencies and pathologies, which he thought could be redressed by 
wide radical reform and modernisation. 
The fact that the Greek administrative system is undergoing a crisis is an 
open secret among professionals, academics, and the public. A number 
of official reports have also been addressed to the biggest malady of the 
country, as it is often called, and have tried to identify the symptoms 
and the means of redress (Makrydemetres and Michalopoulos, eds, 
2000). These reports have not differed greatly in the diagnosis, nor as far 
as the reform recommendations were concerned. 
To go a little bit into the past, according to Kyriakos Varvaressos, who 
produced his influential report on the “Greek Economic Problem” in the 
beginning of the 1950s, the inefficiency of the public services posed the 
most difficult problem confronting the country in its effort to reconstruct 
and develop in the aftermath of the war and 1940’s crisis period. He also 
underlined that administrative dysfunction rendered practically 
impossible the amelioration of the economic condition of the country. 
Varvaressos considered the most serious factors of administrative 
pathology to be: 
(a) The uneven distribution of personnel in the various governmental 
services and institutions which resulted in their concentration in the 
central departments placed at the capital and the very weak staffing of 
the regional and decentralised units. This problem was further 
aggravated by the unabated preservation of an unorthodox system of 
position classification which rendered virtually impossible the 
interagency transfer and circulation of personnel. 
(b) The long established practices of clientelism, favouritism, and 
patronage, the blatant violation of meritocracy and the widespread 
corruption, as well as bribery and low morale even among the top 
ranking officials and administrators. 
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(c) The prevalence of legalism, formalism and bureaupathology in the 
functioning and performance of public services, which not only inhibited 
initiative and creativity in tacking the nation’s problems, but also 
severely troubled and disturbed citizens, especially those of the lower 
and more vulnerable classes and strata of the society. 
Along with proposing concrete measures and reforms to meet these 
particular drawbacks, K. Varvaressos insisted in unmistakable terms that 
an essential, indeed sine qua non, condition to overcome the acute 
administrative plight would be to maintain genuine impartiality and to 
abandon party interference in the affairs of the civil service (including 
appointments and promotions). For that purpose he strongly 
recommended the establishment of an independent Commission of 
Experts that would oversee and evaluate the reform measures and 
strategy. 
At about the same period Georgios Marangopoulos, who subsequently 
became President of the Conseil d’État, drafted a blueprint for the new 
“Methods of Recruitment and Training of the Civil Service Personnel” 
(1950) providing for the generalised application of a system of 
meritocratic appointments in the public service based on competitive 
examinations, the establishment of a distinct class of senior 
administrators and the continuous in-service training and skills 
improvement of public employees. 
A few years later, F.M.G. Willson, an OECD consultant and university 
professor from Great Britain, analysed the “Machinery of Government in 
Greece” (1964), pinpointing the structural deficiencies of the central 
departments of Government, the weak coordination among them and 
the inadequate development of decentralisation. 
At about the same time, another OECD consultant, professor Georges 
Langrod from France, produced the most comprehensive report 
theretofore on the “Reorganisation of Public Administration in Greece” 
(1965). Langrod identified the capacity deficit of the civil service at the 
structural, procedural and personnel levels, and in components of the 
administrative system. He even underlined the fact that the operational 
inadequacy and failure of the civil service contrasted sharply with the 
requirements posited by Greece’s eventual accession to the European 
Community with which Greece had already, since 1961, signed an 
association agreement. (This agreement provided for the first time for a 
full accession date 20 years later, and that was what actually happened 
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in 1981.) In his report, Langrod strongly emphasised the need to raise 
the level of professionalism in administration with all that it entails, the 
intensification and professional re-orientation of the educational 
component at the secondary and tertiary levels, as well as the updating 
and proliferation of in-service training and developmental opportunities. 
Other commentators in the meantime and in view of Greece’s entrance 
to the, then, European Economic Community had pointed out the 
impotence of Greek bureaucracy and had argued that it constituted an 
obstacle to rather than a means toward development and modernisation 
(inter alia, Argyriades, 1970). 
The last three reports which will very briefly be referred to here are the 
“Report on Public Administration” produced in 1988 by a team of 
experts who were brought together by the Centre of Planning and 
Economic Research (KEPE); the white paper on the “Reform and 
Modernisation of the Civil Service”, produced in 1990 by another team 
of experts under the auspices of the Department of Public 
Administration; and, finally, the Mikhail Decleris’ Report on “Greek 
Administration 2000”, which formed the basis of a Cabinet resolution 
that was, however, never implemented. 
Understandably perhaps, after each report was published and 
promulgated, a number of reform measures were announced or even 
enacted in accordance with the recommended interventions. But they 
hardly affected the practical horizon of administrative (poor) 
performance. 
2.1. Aspects of crisis in the administrative system 
As already analysed above, the malfunctioning of the administrative 
system in the country has been identified over the years by numerous 
experts’ reports, as well as by pieces of academic analysis and public 
opinion. The main factors responsible for this quality deficit include not 
only the overall extent of public intervention in economy and society, 
which has been excessive by any means and standards of comparison, 
but also the long tradition of legalism, rigidity and formalism of 
administrative behaviour almost at any level and aspect of state action. 
Furthermore, the infiltration of political —or rather party-political— 
concerns into the operation of state agencies and organisations at the 
  7 
centre and the periphery of the administrative machinery of the country 
does only aggravate the condition of limited professionalism and low 
performance in public administration. Excessive size, political 
dependence, legalistic culture and lack of professionalism, if combined 
as they actually are, become factors which explain much of the 
predicament of public administration in Greece (Makrydemetres, 2013: 
118). 
Whether administrative crisis is a persistent phenomenon in a developed 
country like Greece remains a basic question. The reason is that despite 
various reforms and interventions which have taken place over the last 
40 years or more and the widespread consensus for the need to 
modernise the political system as a whole, state bureaucracy and 
administration have failed to improve in a substantial way. Nor have the 
worst symptoms of maladministration and bureaupathology been 
overcome (Makrydemetres, 2013: 121). 
On the contrary, the features and characteristics of crisis seem to 
persist, if not intensify, and manifest themselves not only in the 
widening gap or deficit of public finance (Makrydemetres, 2013: 131-
132; Kazakos, 2010: 168; Argeitis, Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2011; 
Manitakis, 2012), but also in the nearly negative efficiency and 
effectiveness of the administrative behaviour in the public sector. 
Related aspects of the administrative crisis include: (1) the size of 
personnel that has been found excessive, especially in the past 
(Makrydemetres and Pravita, 2012: 559 ff.; Iordanoglou, 2010: 35 ff., 51 
ff.; Manitakis, 2012), (2) the uneven allocation of duties and 
responsibilities, and the limited professional expertise of public 
employment, (3) the outmoded and ill-shaped organisational structures, 
(4) the virtual absence of modern management methods, principles and 
techniques, and (5) the prevailing legalism, formalism and 
underdevelopment of professional ethos and disrespect for morality in 
the administrative culture of modern Greece. As a result, a sense of 
implementation failure has prevailed in almost every sector of state 
activity and performance. 
The above factors of administrative crisis, linked with others in adjacent 
social systems (i.e. education, party politics, urbanisation, weak 
industrialisation, etc.), produce the particular symptoms of the endemic 
pathology and incapacity of state bureaucracy. Accordingly, the 
administrative crisis does also seem to reflect and perpetuate a wider 
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inertia and weakness of the public sector as a whole. The causes of this 
inertia ought, however, to be sought at the structure and foundations of 
the political behaviour over the years rather than a particular 
coincidence. 
For analytical purposes, it is perhaps warranted to distinguish between 
two main categories of concurring factors or causes of administrative 
crisis in the Greek case, namely the limited external differentiation of 
the administrative domain from politics, political control and party 
dominance (Lyrintzis, 2011; Mavrogordatos, 2001: 225 ff.; Sotiropoulos, 
2007: 31, 106 ff.). And, secondly, the insufficient internal development 
and differentiation of the administrative subsystem in terms of 
structures, functioning and personnel professionalism, which amount to 
an overall capacity crisis of state bureaucracy and administration. 
It does, therefore, seem to be the case that an inverse relationship tends 
to obtain among the above factors. Thus, the intensification of political 
control and domination over state bureaucracy tends in the longer term 
to undermine the conditions of steady development and professional 
advancement —including meritocracy— in the administrative structure 
and culture. As a result, crisis phenomena tend to perpetuate 
themselves, which in turn creates the need for more political 
intervention and control, and so on in a vicious circle. It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that the perception of failure and ineffectiveness of 
reform measures could be regarded as an instance of the phenomenon 
of ‘crisis of the crisis management’. 
The fact that the administrative system in its present shape and 
condition presents itself as an obstacle rather than as a tool and 
sufficient instrument for advancing and serving reforms in economy and 
society needs hardly to be emphasised. Indeed, it is increasingly being 
realised that unless and until administrative reform and modernisation is 
rapidly, effectively and substantially advanced, economy and society will 
be left unsupported in the desert of backwardness and dependence. 
Requisite types and forms of administrative renewal and reform are 
indispensable, in order to open up new possibilities and unleash forces, 
which will contribute to further development in the economic, political 
and social domains in the country. 
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2.2. Capacity deficit and reform 
As far as the prospects of reform are concerned, the optimal strategy 
would then rather tend to focus on increasing and improving the 
capacity and quality of state machinery. That would perhaps have to 
entail to a certain extent taking measures to reduce the overall size and 
scope of state involvement and intervention in economy and society. 
The overstretched and oversized state involvement in an overregulated 
economy and society looks likely as necessary to be reversed and rolled 
back to more manageable proportions (Makrydemetres, 2013: 133-135). 
At the same time, a relevant precondition —a conditio sine qua non— 
for further development in the productive sectors of the economy would 
relate to the substantial amelioration of the quality and professionalism 
of public services. Namely, what is urgently needed is the capacity of the 
state to act efficiently and effectively, in a manner that is responsible 
and accountable to the people and civil society at large. 
The twin strategy of size reduction and capacity improvement lies at the 
heart of the more inclusive policy ideal of reform and ‘re-founding’ or 
reconstructing the state. Re-founding or re-establishing the role and 
functions of the state would then entail striking a new balance in its 
relations with market economy and civil society. Above all, the idea to 
reconstruct the state machinery in the face of new challenges would 
involve special emphasis and attention on the capacity and quality of the 
administrative machinery (Papoulias and Tsoukas, 1998; Michalopoulos, 
2003, 2007; Karkatsoulis, 2004; Maïstros, 2009; Tsekos, 2007; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992; Kliksberg, 2001; Rondinelli and Cheema, 2003; IRAS, 
2009). The quality of state performance in the various branches of 
Government and public administration forms an indispensable condition 
for sustainable development. And development ought to be understood 
in qualitative terms too, enhancing the potential for an open and more 
democratic policy, enriched with public services and institutions that 
function well and respond to people’s desires and demands in the 
context of the rule of law. 
Raising the capacity level of the Greek administrative system does 
certainly involve reshaping the structure of central service units, and in 
particular the reduction of the number of units related to the central 
policy determination. That is being suggested by the Memorandum of 
Understanding, as it is going to be explained further on, but it has also 
been part of the Greek government experience that the coordination 
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policy is facilitated by the rationalisation of the central government 
structures, including the reduction of CGDs (Pravita, 2013). 
Overall, a kind of a ‘paradigmatic shift’ is underlying the whole effort to 
‘reinvent’ public governance and administration in contemporary 
Greece. Thus, a new emphasis is more than visible on the need to 
circumscribe the institutional monopoly of the centralised state 
administration by attempting to reduce and optimise its regulatory 
intervention in the economy and society. 
2.3. The recent crisis and administrative reform in Greece 
The modernisation of public administration formed one of the structural 
policies that Greece assumed the responsibility to implement in the 
context of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy 
(confirmed by Law 3845/2010 concerning the “measures to be taken for 
the implementation of the support mechanism for the Greek economy 
by the Euro area Member States and the International Monetary Fund”), 
with the aim to contain expenses as well as to improve the effectiveness 
of public services. It was envisaged inter alia that the Greek Government 
would collaborate with the European Commission in order to “launch an 
independent external functional evaluation” of central administration of 
the country. In subsequent Law 4024/2011, which referred to the 
implementation of the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Framework 2012-2015, 
enacted by the Government of the then Prime Minister Georgios A. 
Papandreou, it was specified that evaluation of structural units and the 
personnel is necessary for the rationalisation of public administration 
and, in particular, the reconstruction of public services by means of 
drafting new organisational charts of ministerial structures, the merger 
of service units, the transfer of personnel and the abolishment of 
redundant posts.1 For that reason a special Committee was set up in 
each ministry (article 35). 
Despite the change of Government in 2011 and again in 2012, the 
country continued to be under the obligation to curtail and downsize 
general government units (Law 4046/2012 “Approval of Plans of 
Financial Facilitation between the European Financial Stability Facility 
                                                 
1
 The typical structure of a ministry (or department of State) includes General Secretariats, General 
Directorates, Directorates, Sections and Bureaus. The political leadership of a ministry, apart from the 
minister, often includes alternate ministers, deputy ministers and secretaries general (or special). Civil 
servants employed in the above-mentioned organisational units perform the corresponding duties 
and competences. 
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(EFSF), the Greek Republic and the Bank of Greece, the Plan of 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Greek Republic, the 
European Commission and the Bank of Greece, and other urgent 
measures to reduce the public debt and rescue the national economy”), 
which is suggestive of the fact that rather little of previous obligations 
had been efficiently and effectively implemented. Therefore, the effort 
for reorganising public administration was maintained. In this context, 
and taken account of the concrete schedule for the implementation, it 
was considered as necessary the establishment at the Ministry of 
Administrative Reform and E-Governance οf a stable structure for Inter-
Ministerial Coordination, which would provide better guidance and 
break the intra-Ministry attitude of neglect and inertia (European 
Commission, 2012: 12-13, 38). Equally necessary was considered the 
setting up of a high-level transformation steering group, under the Prime 
Minister’s authority, with the responsibility to “supervise, monitor and 
ensure the implementation of administrative reforms”. Thus, the 
Governmental Council of Administrative Reform was set up and assumed 
the responsibility of policy design for the improvement of organisation, 
functioning and effectiveness of public services, as well as of the 
evaluation of the results achieved and the decisions taken on them. 
Additionally, various Committees in distinct departments of State 
comprised of civil servants in the Greek public administration and their 
colleagues from other European countries (e.g. France) prepared reports 
on the reshaping of the internal structure of ministries, which were 
further elaborated by the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance. They were even further revised after a certain period of 
time elapsed by the Governmental Council of Administrative Reform, 
which finally approved them. 
2.3.1. The Administrative Reform 2013 
In the publication Greece: Review of the Central Administration (OECD, 
2011: 24) it has been highlighted that a fundamental role is played by 
the Central Government Departments (CGDs), “which are formally 
responsible for the supervision of all other entities of the public sector”. 
As a matter of fact, however, government departments are 
characterised by organisational sprawl, which leads —among others— to 
poor quality of public services and ineffectiveness (Ministry of 
Administrative Reform and E-Governance, 2012: 39). 
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The Administrative Reform 2013 (AR2013) is the most recent reform 
project for the Greek public administration, the details of which were 
announced by the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance 
in late April 2013. The AR2013 aimed to reform the administrative 
machinery of the State regarding the central government, adopting the 
managerial and organisational principle of the ‘unity of direction’ and 
attaining the appropriate span of control for a more effective public 
management. 
The government machinery in Greece —the way it was shaped after the 
government reshuffling of June 24th 2013, under the premiership of Mr. 
Antonios Samaras— had been structured into a complex of eighteen 
separate central departments (ministries),2 among which the members 
of the Government were distributed, with the exception of the Prime 
Minister and Minister of State, who were not in charge of any specific 
ministry.3 
The CGDs consist of usually untidy agglomerations of public services and 
respective jurisdictions at the central level of the government, under the 
leadership of members of the Government, and function with the aim of 
the formulation and implementation of goals of public interest and 
respective spaces of public policy. The forms and denominations of 
departments of State delineate and share basic branches of public 
services at the central level of the government, as is the case in most 
contemporary and in particular European countries. They assume a 
guiding role in the formulation of public policy including the design and 
implementation of the legal and regulatory framework in various 
domains of public action. As a result, government departments not only 
represent the most basic pillars of the organisation of the central 
administrative machinery of the State, but also form the most crucial 
institutional components in the process of formulation and 
implementation of public policy. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 
                                                 
2
 See infra, pages 56-57: Table 1. Configuration of the General Government structure. 
3
 The structure of the government mechanism in Greece has developed till recently (January 2015) 
into 18 distinct ministries. This shows that the somewhat ‘generous’ arrangement of the government 
structure has continued to remain a ‘constant’ throughout almost all the post-War period and, in any 
event, during the period of the Third Hellenic Republic (from 1975 onwards). It would, therefore, not 
be unfair to say that this is perhaps indicative both of the wide range of public policy, which extends 
into almost all areas of social action and of the magnitude of state intervention in the social sphere. It 
also reflects the corresponding need for control of public bureaucracy by an equally complex and 
extensive political superstructure, with numerous government posts and appointed political offices 
for the guaranteeing of policy guidance over the administrative infrastructure (bureaucratic 
machinery). 
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greater part of policy making takes place in association with or within 
them. 
Taking account of the historical evolution of the CGDs (Makrydemetres 
and Pravita, 2012: 290 ff.), they include major institutional components 
in respective policy areas, such as: home administration and security of 
the State, foreign policy and defence, economic policy, public works and 
infrastructure, social policy, education, national heritage and culture. 
Despite the fact that the size and extent of policy composition of state 
machinery may vary through time and with the political orientations of 
the social forces, the core element of the Government composition is 
formulated in respective ministerial or departmental structures and 
services. 
The AR2013 placed emphasis on the operational restructuring 
(downsizing) of the following Greek CGDs and Secretariats General:4 
 Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of the Interior 
 Ministry of Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Networks 
Heretofore: 
 Ministry of Development and Competitiveness 
 Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks 
 Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Culture and Sport 
Heretofore: 
 Ministry of Education and Religion 
 Ministry of Culture and Sports 
 Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance 
 Ministry of Health 
 Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare 
 Ministry of Rural Development and Food 
 Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change 
 Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights 
 Ministry of Tourism 
 Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean 
 Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/other_pages2/dioikitiki_metarithmisi_2013.htm. 
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 Secretariat General of Information and Communication, and the 
Secretariat General of Mass Media. 
 
The scope of the AR2013 was the enhancement of performance, 
efficiency and control over the expenses of these particular public 
bodies, the reduction of their size through the reshaping of their 
structure, and the amelioration of the quality of the related public 
services. In addition, it was regarded by the Ministry of Administrative 
Reform and E-Governance as the basis for the implementation of 
mobility and the dismissal of redundant civil service staff. 
Taking into account that the Greek economic crisis is mainly due to fiscal 
problems, the importance of the AR2013 was significantly high for the 
Greek economy and public administration. The urgency of this 
administrative reform and its immediate implementation was made 
explicit in the reports of the European Commission (2013) that reviewed 
the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, and in the 
press releases of the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance. 
2.3.1.1. Focus of reform analysis 
Analysing the internal environment of public administration refers to 
parameters and processes which characterise a complex system as such. 
Formal study of the internal structure of the administrative organisation 
is usually inclusive of the following elements: 
(a) Operational activities which pertain to the description of professional 
structuring, categories of the public that are being served, relations with 
relative institutions, etc. 
(b) Organisation and functioning of the dominant administrative 
structure including political guidance and control, organisational charts 
of the basic service units as well as description of the function at the 
level of directorates general, directorates, sections, and the rest of the 
service units. 
(c) Human and material resources, the personnel and their skills, 
competencies and capabilities (moral, professional and intellectual), 
technical and informational infrastructure, financial resources. 
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The following analysis adopts a structured approach that is based on the 
collection and classification of information concerning the above in an 
organised and methodical manner, including flowcharts, budgetary 
information and size of personnel. 
The study of the internal environment is being conducted at a certain 
depth and scope which may perhaps facilitate the identification of a 
series of strong and weak points. The in-depth analysis of the internal 
environment of the administrative machinery aimed particularly at the 
following elements or aspects of its functioning, on the basis of which 
may be extracted the conclusions: 
(a) Depicting the existing organisation and structure of the central 
service units of the government departments on the basis of the 
available material envisaging it (legal documents and enactments 
referring to the administrative structure of CGDs), 
(b) Extracting the relevant information resulting from the above in the 
form of organisational flowcharts, span of control in units at the various 
administrative hierarchy, 
(c) Describing and analysing jurisdictional demarcations along the lines 
which the policy space of the respective departments is being defined 
and organised, and 
(d) A certain element of comparative evaluation and benchmarking at 
the empirical administrative analysis of the available material that may 
contribute to the more objective evaluation of the manner of the 
organisation and functioning of the system under examination. 
2.3.1.2. New structure of the ministries 
New organisation charts of the ministries were issued (in the form of 
presidential decrees) by the end of August 2014 and were put in force 
about two months later (by the beginning of November 2014). The 
Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance announced that 
the overall reduction of the size of the service units in the ministries 
exceeded 40%, which led to respective reduction of expense. The latter 
further contributed to efficiency and effectiveness improvement in 
public administration. Presumably, contraction of the structure of the 
services facilitates the coordination of the units. The OECD Review for 
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Greece (2011: 57) underlined the need for drastic reduction of 
administrative structures in the central level of governance, as well as 
the rationalisation of their internal organisation to achieve increased 
administrative productivity. 
In the process of restructuring of the organisational charts by the then 
Government (2014), an effort was made so that certain concrete 
principles of organisational rationality would be taken into account. It 
was expected, therefore, that the criteria of internal differentiation of 
the ministries would follow the precepts of ‘unity of direction’ and ‘unity 
of command’ as well as the optimisation of ‘span of control’. As far as 
the ‘unity of direction’ is concerned, it is worth mentioning that the units 
of administrative support of the central services of the ministries were 
merged with those of secretaries general which existed in the various 
departments of State. The same occurred with the service units with the 
responsibility regarding matters of finance and information technology. 
The Ministry of Administrative Reform has identified the ‘span of 
control’ within the central administrative structure of the country as a 
particularly “problematic aspect of the Greek central administration” 
(Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance, 2012: 40-41). In 
one out of five sections, for instance, the head of the respective unit had 
no subordinate employees at all, while one in three sections has only 
one employee (OECD, 2011: 26, 56). 
The optimal span of control of 1/5-7 with regard to the head of the 
section and its subordinates may be overcome, when that is necessary 
and is required by the particularities of the subject matter of the service 
unit. The new organisational charts have frequently included a rather 
narrow span of control, even with a ratio of ½, which can hardly be 
considered sustainable. Such are, indicatively, the cases of the 
Directorate of Elections in the Ministry of the Interior (Presidential 
Decree 105/2014, article 16), as well as the Directorate of Buildings 
Infrastructure in the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks 
(Presidential Decree 109/2014, article 47). Related examples are those 
of the Directorate General of University Education in the Ministry of 
Education and Religion (Presidential Decree 114/2014, article 35); the 
Directorate General of Personnel Administration in the Ministry of 
Administrative Reform and E-Governance (Presidential Decree 99/2014, 
article 13); and the Directorate General of Justice, Transparency and 
Human Rights in the same titled Ministry (Presidential Decree 101/2014, 
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article 5). The Directorate General of Public Investment in the Ministry of 
Development and Competitiveness is comprised by a single Directorate, 
the one of Public Investment (Presidential Decree 116/2014, article 37). 
Nevertheless, the criticism that has been exerted regarding the whole 
effort has indicated that the process of reform seems to be rather 
fragmentary. It has placed special emphasis on the numerical reduction 
of the service units without taking account of the necessary extent of the 
functional complementarity of administrative units, as well as the 
overlapping of competences even within the same ministry and even 
more among different ministries. Moreover, the restructuring was based 
on the existing government scheme at the time, without examining the 
possibility of each reform in the direction of the reduction of the number 
of ministries themselves or an alternative agglomeration of various 
sectors of public policy. Otherwise, internal restructuring of particular 
ministries which form part of a rather extended or fragmented 
governmental structure (comprised of a rather large number of 
ministries headed by full ministers or alternate ministers, not to include 
deputy ministers) seems to have little impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Government as a whole. That is why, although the 
number of CGDs has been reduced, the phenomenon of scattered office 
locations has not been dealt with at all.5 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this study, an attempt is made to measure efficiency and effectiveness 
of administrative units in the 19 CGDs. Accordingly, a comparison takes 
place between the results of this measurement and those of the 
AR2013. The measurement of efficiency and effectiveness draws on four 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models: i) Variable Returns to Scale 
DEA (VRS DEA), ii) Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA (Targeted DEA), 
iii) Stochastic DEA, and iv) Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA (QE-
DEA). 
DEA is a widely applied non-parametric technique for measuring the 
relative efficiency and performance of operational or decision making 
units (DMUs). Based on the seminal paper of Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978), standard DEA programmes use linear programming to 
                                                 
5
 Regarding the sitting of the administrative centre, see Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance, 2012: 65 ff., OECD, 2011: 63-64. 
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evaluate the production process of operational units. Conventional DEA 
programmes are either input-oriented, where the objective is the 
minimisation of inputs while holding the outputs fixed, or output-
oriented, where the objective is the maximisation of outputs while the 
inputs remain unchanged. 
Since the AR2013 suggests a decrease of inputs of the CGDs, in this 
paper an application takes place of four input-oriented DEA expressions. 
The DMUs that use relatively minimum inputs for the amount of outputs 
they engage (input-oriented approach of the measurement of efficiency) 
are regarded as benchmarks. The benchmark units are located in the 
production frontier and are assigned efficiency scores equal to unity, or 
100% while the slacks of their production process is zero. 
The scope of the study is to assess whether the input levels of the 19 
CGDs, as defined by the AR2013, lead these units to efficiency, optimal 
economy and effectiveness. This assessment draws on a comparative 
analysis between the input levels identified by the AR2013 and those 
measured by the four DEA expressions. The VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and 
Stochastic DEA measure efficiency, under different assumptions, while 
the QE-DEA measures effectiveness. 
Prior to the presentation of the four DEA expressions, it is useful to 
provide an analytic description of the notions efficiency and 
effectiveness, and the way they are perceived and applied in the context 
of the present study: 
Efficiency of a unit refers essentially to the production of as many 
outputs as possible from a given set of inputs (output-oriented 
efficiency) or the utilisation of as few inputs as possible to produce a 
fixed amount of outputs (input-oriented efficiency) (Farrell, 1957). In the 
case of single-output and single-input, the measure of efficiency points 
to the ratio of output over input. Output-oriented efficiency is measured 
by the maximum ratio of the sum of weighted outputs to the sum of 
weighted inputs, as long as that ratio for every unit under evaluation is 
less than or equal to unity. Similarly, input-oriented efficiency is 
measured by the minimum ratio of the sum of weighed inputs to the 
sum of weighted outputs as long as that ratio for every unit under 
evaluation is greater than or equal to unity (Charnes et al., 1978). It is 
evident then that efficiency is regarded as an operational measure; as it 
only takes into account the inputs and outputs of a production process. 
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Effectiveness, on the other hand, refers essentially to the capacity to 
achieve desired results (Sherman and Zhu, 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004; Poister, 2003). Effectiveness goes then beyond efficiency as the 
latter can be one of the goals that a unit is expected to achieve. An 
objective for the administrative units forms the provision of perceived 
high-quality services that satisfy users (i.e. citizens) (Ferlie et al., 2007; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). 
In this study, effectiveness is defined as referring to the attainment of 
efficiency and employees’ satisfaction from the work environment, too. 
Employees’ satisfaction is regarded as the users’ perspective of the 
performance of the unit. Citizens’ satisfaction is not, however, an 
appropriate measure for evaluation since there is usually no interaction 
between citizens and CGDs, but mainly between citizens and the 
decentralised units of the government departments as well as the local 
agencies. 
3.1. Variable Returns to Scale DEA 
An extension of the original Constant Returns to Scale DEA (CRS DEA) 
programme put forth by Charnes et al. (1978) is the Variable Returns to 
Scale DEA (VRS DEA) programme introduced by Banker et al. (1984). The 
input-oriented VRS DEA programme is defined as follows: 
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where  (0 1)    is a scalar and represents efficiency, ijx  stands for the 
ith input of the jth unit and rjy  denotes the rth output of the jth unit. The 
iox  and roy  are the ith input and rth output of the unit under evaluation, 
respectively. In addition, j  are non-negative scalars. The non-zero 
optimal j  identify the benchmarks for the unit under evaluation. 
3.2. Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA 
The Targeted factor-oriented radial DEA (Targeted DEA) programme 
developed by Lim and Zhu (2013) incorporates target levels in DEA. In 
addition to traditional inputs and outputs, variables which have a 
specific target level are introduced in the DEA programme. In 
conventional DEA programmes, the objective is either the minimisation 
of inputs (input orientation) or the maximisation of outputs (output 
orientation). In the Targeted DEA programme, the objective for inputs 
and outputs remains the same as that of the conventional DEA 
programmes. The novelty in the Targeted DEA programme is the 
introduction of a third type of variable, called ‘factors’, which can move 
in two directions (i.e. increase or decrease) aiming to reach a targeted 
level that is set by the decision-makers. In this study, when the Targeted 
DEA programme is applied, the variable ‘Budget 2013’ is treated as a 
factor, and its target level is the ‘Budget 2014’. 
The input-oriented Targeted DEA programme developed by Lim and Zhu 
(2013) can be written as follows: 
min  
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        0                                     1,...,j j n          (2) 
where   represents efficiency, ijx  and rjy  express the ith input and the 
rth output, respectively, of the jth unit, tjz  stands for the tth factor of the 
jth unit, and tw  denotes the targeted level for the tth factor. 
3.3. Stochastic DEA 
Stochastic DEA (Charnes and Cooper, 1963; Land et al., 1993; Olesen and 
Petersen, 1995; Dyson and Shale, 2010) deals with measurement and 
specification errors by introducing stochastic inputs and outputs in DEA. 
The uncertainty that is present both to the input and output data, which 
raises doubts about their accuracy, and to the economic environment 
inside which the units operate, leads to the utilisation of a stochastic 
DEA programme to capture this uncertainty. The application of 
traditional (i.e. non-stochastic) DEA programmes in cases where 
uncertainty is possible leads to biases in the measurement of efficiency. 
In the present study, Stochastic DEA was applied in order to test an 
alternative scenario of evaluating the efficiency of the 19 CGDs, which 
takes into account possible ‘noise’ in data. The Stochastic DEA 
programme applied here is as follows: 
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where   expresses efficiency, ijx  and rjy  represent the ith input and the 
rth output, respectively, of the jth unit, 
1( )   denotes the normal 
distribution function,   is the level of significance (e.g. .05  ), and j  
are non-negative scalars. In addition, ( )ijE x  and ( )rjE y  are the means of 
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ijx  and rjy , and cov( , )ij plx x  and cov( , )rj qly y  stand for the covariance of ,ip jx  
and ,rq ly , respectively. 
3.4. Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA 
The Quality-driven Efficiency-adjusted DEA (QE-DEA) method 
(Zervopoulos and Palaskas, 2011; Brissimis and Zervopoulos, 2012; 
Zervopoulos, 2014) introduces exogenous variables in DEA, such as 
users’ satisfaction. Exogenous variables are those that are either non-
controlled or partially controlled by the unit. The exogenous variables 
should be equal to or greater than a threshold value set by decision 
makers. The measurement of efficiency is constrained by this threshold 
value for the exogenous variables. In other words, the minimum inputs 
defined by the QE-DEA method cannot violate the threshold value. In 
the case that the exogenous variables are inversely related to efficiency, 
which means that the former are directly related to inputs, the optimal 
(minimal) inputs should not cause the optimal levels of the exogenous 
variables to drop lower than a minimum acceptable value. 
In this analysis, use is being made of one exogenous variable (i.e. 
employees’ satisfaction) inversely related to efficiency. The threshold 
value set for employees’ satisfaction is 0.800, which is the percentage 
transformation of a rating of four on the five-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 – 
very dissatisfied, 2 – dissatisfied, 3 – neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 – 
satisfied and 5 – very satisfied). The QE-DEA method defines the 
minimum inputs that simultaneously satisfy the threshold value of the 
exogenous variable. Consequently, the minimum inputs defined by the 
QE-DEA model are expected to be greater than those obtained from the 
VRS DEA. The lower the satisfaction scores assigned by employees to the 
CGDs, the lower the reductions that are expected to apply to the inputs 
as the priority of the QE-DEA method is to satisfy the threshold value, 
which is set to the exogenous variable. 
The QE-DEA model draws on an algorithm comprised of four-steps: 
Step 1: Apply VRS DEA (i.e. model (1)) to define the efficiency scores 
of the units. 
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Step 2: The efficient units that are assigned employees’ satisfaction 
scores lower than the threshold value (e.g. 0.800) are put 
through an adjustment process. This leads the employees’ 
satisfaction score at least to the threshold value while 
proportionally decreasing the efficiency score according to the 
inverse relationship between employees’ satisfaction and 
efficiency. The adjustment process is expressed by the 
following formula: 
     
         
1/2
22 2 '
'
22 2 2 2'
1
1 1
o o o
o
o o o o o
s s s s
s s s s s s

 
 
    
   
         
          (4) 
where 
'  stands for the adjusted efficiency score, o  is a user-
defined cut-off level for the efficiency score (e.g. 0.200), s  
denotes the employees’ satisfaction score, os  stands for a 
user-defined cut-off level for the satisfaction score (e.g. 
0.200), and 
's  is the adjusted employees’ satisfaction score, 
which should be equal to or greater than the threshold value 
(e.g. 0.800). 
The adjustment of the efficiency score (i.e. 
' ) requires 
modification of the inputs: 
' ' 1( )      1,...,i ix x i m
                (5) 
where 
'
ix  denotes the modified inputs, and ix  the original 
inputs. From expression (5), it is straightforward that 
'
i ix x  as 
' 1  . 
Step 3: The adjusted inputs (
'
ix ) replace the original ones in the 
dataset, and VRS DEA is re-applied. 
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The QE-DEA model ensures that the benchmarks both are efficient and 
are assigned employees’ satisfaction scores equal to or greater than a 
threshold value.6 
3.5. Evaluating AR2013 
The following analysis is focusing on the government composition 
(government departments) and the basic internal units (general 
directorates, directorates, sections), the size of the staff, the elements of 
the budget and the legal enactments: Refer to Table 1 in Appendix 
Regarding Table 1, we have taken account of the following: 
A government reshuffle took place in June 2013, as a result of which a 
new ministerial structure emerged (ante, pages 13-14), whereby two 
ministries were divided and the total number of CGDs rose to eighteen 
(from sixteen); in that number has to be added the distinct Secretary 
General of Information and Communication along with that with Mass 
Media responsibility. 
The evaluation of the internal structure of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, National Defence, Public Order and Citizen’s Protection has not 
led so far to any significant reorganisation; for that reason the data 
referring to the years 2013 and 2014 do not present any difference 
whatsoever. 
The number of organisational units (Directorates, etc.) refers exclusively 
to those at the central services of the ministries (i.e. they are not 
inclusive of the decentralised ones). It is worth mentioning that, as it was 
emphasised within the OECD Review concerning the Central 
Government in the country (2011: 57), it is not unlikely that 
administrative practice may not reflect the legal provisions regarding 
ministries’ competences, whereas the organisational charts which are 
presented in the website of each one have many differences from the 
legal and the actual administrative structures (OECD, 2011: 57). 
In the overall number of Directorates General there have been included 
the Secretariats General, which comprise of Directorates only. 
As far as the number of permanent civil servants is concerned, the 
respective data have been searched in the Public Employees Record 
                                                 
6
 More details on the QE-DEA model are provided in Zervopoulos and Palaskas (2011). 
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(www.apografi.gov.gr), which however presents the total number of 
civil servants in the ministries including those employed in central 
services, in decentralised units and in public bodies and agencies. The 
Record is constantly being revised, taking account of the personnel 
transfer and mobility, so that certain variations may be seen in the 
passage of time. 
A special case is that of the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights, since in the personnel there are included the judicial 
functionaries, who are nevertheless not considered as civil servants in 
the strict sense of the term; similar is the case of the Ministry of Shipping 
and the Aegean, in the personnel of which there are included civil and 
military staff. 
With regard to the budgetary documents we took into account 
resources referring to the central services of the ministries, solely, 
excluding decentralised units, public bodies and agencies supervised by 
the ministries, as well as the related independent authorities. 
Nonetheless, in certain cases that was not attainable. For instance, in 
the Ministry of Culture and Sports, because in the central government 
budget reference is being made to culture services only (which is most 
likely inclusive of the decentralised units, as well). Similar are the cases 
of the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and Climate Change, the 
Ministry of Tourism, etc. 
We signify with an asterisk those ministries with regard to which the 
above-mentioned variations may occur. 
We have based our research and cross-reference regarding the 
promulgating legal documents on the websites of Hellenic Parliament as 
well as the Government Printing Office. 
4. Findings and results of the research 
 
4.1. Efficiency measurement tool 
 
The aforementioned methods and programmes were applied to Central 
Government Departments to measure their efficiency and effectiveness, 
and define their optimal input levels. These input levels, holding the 
output (i.e. laws) fixed (input-oriented analysis), ensure the attainment 
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of efficiency (i.e. efficiency score equal to unity) and effectiveness (i.e. 
effectiveness score equal to unity) for every CGD. In addition, the 
optimal inputs obtained from the application of the methods and 
programmes (1) - (5) are compared against the inputs defined by the 
AR2013 for the nineteen CGDs. The reason for this comparative analysis 
is to examine whether the AR2013 leads the CGDs to efficiency and 
effectiveness or only aims to reduce public spending. 
The methods and programmes (i.e. VRS DEA, Targeted DEA, Stochastic 
DEA and QE-DEA) were applied to both the nineteen CGDs, which 
comprise the complete sample under reform, and a subsample of twelve 
CGDs. The CGDs excluded from the second sample (ante, pages 24-25) 
are presented with an asterisk (*) following their name in the Tables that 
include nineteen CGDs (i.e. Tables 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16 and 18-21). 
The efficiency scores of the nineteen CGDs and the twelve CGDs are 
displayed in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. In particular, in both Tables, 
columns 3, 4 and 5 present the efficiency scores defined by the 
application of the VRS DEA, the Targeted DEA and the Stochastic DEA 
programmes, respectively. Column 6 illustrates the effectiveness scores 
determined by QE-DEA, which balance efficiency and civil servants’ 
perception of quality of their work environment. 
The calculation of the VRS DEA efficiency scores drew on the five inputs 
and one output of our dataset (see Table 1). To determine the Targeted 
DEA efficiency scores, a target was set for the input variable ‘Budget 
2013’, which is the input variable ‘Budget 2014’. According to the 
AR2013, no CGD should spend more than the amount determined in 
‘Budget 2014’. The Stochastic DEA programme yields efficiency scores, 
which take into account the possibility of ‘noise’ in the data. The 
presence of ‘noise’, which is not unlikely in data from public 
organisations, is responsible for significant distortion of the results. Such 
flaws are particularly associated with non-parametric techniques (e.g. 
DEA), which are sensitive to sampling variations. 
Unlike the previous three DEA programmes which only take into account 
endogenous variables (i.e. inputs and outputs), the QE-DEA method 
yields scores that incorporate exogenous variables, such as employees’ 
satisfaction, in addition to input and output variables. The QE-DEA 
scores are associated with effectiveness since they express a balance 
between the operational perspective (i.e. efficiency) and the 
environmental perspective (i.e. employees’ satisfaction). Employees’ 
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satisfaction is regarded as an environmental variable since it cannot be 
directly or fully controlled by the management of the unit (i.e. CGD). 
However, employees’ satisfaction affects the quantity and quality of the 
outputs of the unit (i.e. CGD). 
In Tables 2 and 3, the efficient CGDs are assigned efficiency scores equal 
to unity, which is equivalent to 100% of efficiency. CGDs with efficiency 
scores lower than unity are regarded as inefficient and in need of 
operational reform. In other words, taking into account the orientation 
of AR2013 and of this research, the inefficient CGDs should reduce their 
inputs to a certain level to become efficient. Refer to Table 2 in Appendix 
According to Table 2, the four DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted, 
Stochastic and QE-DEA) recognise as efficient and effective the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (ID #1), National Defence (ID #3), Health (ID 
#9), Infrastructure, Transport & Networks (ID #12), Environment, Energy 
& Climate Change (ID #13), Justice, Transparency & Human Rights (ID 
#14), Public Order & Citizen’s Protection (ID # 15), Tourism (ID #16), and 
Macedonia & Thrace (ID #18). Accordingly, the Ministries that need 
significant reform are those assigned the lowest scores, such as the 
Ministries of Education & Religion (ID #6), Culture & Sports (ID #7), and 
Labour, Social Security & Welfare (ID #10). However, it should be noted 
that the first and third Ministries cannot be directly compared with the 
other Ministries that have no asterisk indication following their name, 
since a significant number of their tenured staff is employed in 
decentralised departments and public entities supervised by the 
Ministries (e.g. primary and secondary schools, social security offices). 
Refer to Table 3 in Appendix 
In Table 3, the CGDs that are regarded as efficient and effective, 
according to the four DEA programmes are the same as in Table 2. The 
scores presented in Table 3 are expected to be higher than these in 
Table 2. This expected upward movement is due not to a true efficiency 
and effectiveness change but to the decrease of the sample size while 
the dimensions of the input-output set remain unchanged. However, 
there may be some exceptions, such as the Targeted DEA efficiency 
score assigned to the Ministry of Rural Development & Food (ID #7). This 
score is significantly lower (i.e. 0.2947) compared to the corresponding 
efficiency score assigned to the same Ministry (i.e. 0.9992) when the 
sample consisted of nineteen CGDs. The decline of this particular 
efficiency score is explained by the change of the benchmark CGDs for 
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the Ministry of Rural Development & Food (Tables 4 and 5). In particular, 
in the case of the nineteen-CGD sample, the production process of the 
Ministry of Rural Development & Food was dominated by the production 
process of the Ministry of Tourism (ID #16) and the Ministry of 
Macedonia & Thrace (ID #18). In other words, the latter two Ministries 
were regarded as benchmarks for the Ministry of Rural Development & 
Food. In the case of the twelve-CGD sample, four Ministries are defined 
as benchmarks for the Ministry of Rural Development & Food, which are 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ID #1), the Ministry of Environment, 
Energy & Climate Change (ID #9), the Ministry of Tourism (ID #10), and 
the Ministry of Macedonia & Thrace (ID #11). 
Tables 4 and 5, particularly columns 3-6, illustrate the benchmark CGD(s) 
for every dominated CGD presented in column 2. It should be noted that 
the production process of the benchmark CGDs does not have the same 
impact on all of the dominated CGDs, which are inefficient. The efficient 
CGDs are self-dominated. For instance, there is a single benchmark CGD 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is efficient according to the 
VRS, Targeted and Stochastic DEA programmes (Tables 2 and 3), and 
effective according to the QE-DEA method, that is the same Ministry 
(Tables 4 and 5). Refer to Table 4 in Appendix 
In Table 4, drawing on the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and QE-DEA results, 
the CGD that appears most frequently as a benchmark is the Macedonia 
& Thrace (ID #18). In particular, VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and QE-DEA 
identify this Ministry as a benchmark nine times, eight times and six 
times, respectively. In the VRS DEA context, the second most dominant 
production process is that of the Ministry of Tourism (ID #16), which 
appears seven times as a benchmark for the inefficient CGDs. In the case 
of the Targeted DEA and QE-DEA, the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport & Networks (ID #12) are 
benchmarks for three inefficient CGDs. According to the Stochastic DEA 
results, the two most dominant CGDs are the Ministry of Tourism (ID 
#16) and the Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human Rights (ID #14), 
which are identified as benchmarks nine times and seven times, 
respectively. Refer to Table 5 in Appendix 
In the case of the reduced sample, the Ministries of Macedonia and 
Thrace, and Tourism remain the most dominant for the inefficient CGDs 
(Table 5). The Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace is also identified as the 
most dominant for the ineffective CGDs. In particular, the Ministry of 
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Macedonia and Thrace is identified as a benchmark six times and five 
times by the VRS DEA programme and the Targeted DEA programme, 
respectively. The same Ministry is regarded as a benchmark three times 
by the QE-DEA method since it is efficient and reports a high level of 
employees’ satisfaction. According to the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA 
programmes, the Ministry of Tourism dominates the production process 
of four inefficient CGDs and six inefficient CGDs, respectively. In addition 
to these two Ministries, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and 
Climate Change is identified many times as benchmark by the three DEA 
programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted and Stochastic). 
The following Tables (i.e. Tables 6-13) present the actual input levels 
before the implementation of the AR2013 (column 3), the input levels 
suggested by AR2013 programme, and the change in the input levels 
before and after the implementation of the AR2013. In addition, in 
Tables 6-13, columns 6-14 illustrate the optimal input levels as defined 
by the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes. On the 
right-hand side of the columns with the optimal inputs, the change 
between the actual and optimal input levels, and the one between the 
AR2013 input levels and optimal input levels is displayed. Refer to Table 
6 in Appendix 
Focusing on the number of general directorates for every CGD, the 
AR2013 programme suggested a decrease between 0.07 (or 7%), which 
applies to the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness, and 0.44 
(or 44%), which applies to the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance. In addition, there are four CGDs that do not need to limit 
the number of their general directorates, namely, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public 
Order and Citizen’s Protection, and the Ministry of Tourism. 
The three DEA programmes regard as optimal the actual number of 
general directorates for the four CGDs mentioned above. In particular, 
VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes hold unchanged the number 
of general directorates of ten CGDs (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Health). The number of general 
directorates that was optimal in 2013 increases to eleven, according to 
the Targeted DEA programme. 
According to Table 6, the most significant decrease in the number of 
general directorates should be introduced in the Ministries of Education 
and Religion, and Culture and Sports. Only the VRS DEA programme 
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suggests the same significant decrease in the number of general 
directorates for the Ministry of the Interior. It is clear from Table 6 that 
the levels of adjustment that should be applied to the number of general 
directorates vary depending on which DEA programme is used for the 
evaluation of the activity of the CGDs. The Targeted DEA and Stochastic 
DEA programmes are better at expressing either a fundamental target of 
the Greek public administration, which is control over the spending of 
the CGDs, or the ‘noise’ that the data of the CGDs is likely to contain. 
Through the DEA-based evaluation that was applied in this paper and 
the associated research that was conducted, it can be identified how the 
optimal number of general directorates deviates from the level 
introduced by AR2013, which applies to most of the CGDs in Table 6. It is 
noteworthy that the deviations are not only negative but also positive. 
Negative deviations of the optimal number of general directorates, or, in 
general, of the optimal input levels, from the level of the corresponding 
input as defined by AR2013 imply the need for an additional decrease in 
this input to ensure the attainment of efficiency by the CGD. In the case 
of positive deviations, an increase in the level of input, compared to that 
determined by AR2013, is required to ensure the efficiency of the CGD. 
Refer to Table 7 in Appendix  
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture and Sports 
remain among those that need the greatest adjustment to the number 
of their general directorates, even when the sample size is reduced to 
twelve CGDs (Table 7). In particular, based on the VRS DEA programme, 
the optimal number of general directorates for the Ministry of the 
Interior is one, whereas it was six before the AR2013 and dropped to five 
after the implementation of the AR2013. When the Targeted DEA and 
Stochastic DEA programmes are taken into account, the optimal number 
of general directorates for the same Ministry is two. Nevertheless, 
generally speaking, taking account of the fact that the optimised span of 
control is defined by the ratio 1/5-7, the above-mentioned provides 
evidence for the need that the Ministry should not be a distinct 
department but it should be merged with other service units. On the 
contrary, the three DEA programmes define as optimal the twelve 
general directorates for the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate 
Change, which were operating before the implementation of the 
AR2013. 
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Deviations between optimal levels of resources and the corresponding 
levels defined by the AR2013 are present in most CGDs. However, there 
is consensus between the AR2013 and the programmes about the 
number of general directorates of the three Ministries (i.e. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Tourism, and Ministry of Macedonia and 
Thrace). This consensus appears only in cases where there is no need for 
adjustment. Refer to Table 8 in Appendix 
Focusing on the number of directorates, when nineteen CGDs are under 
evaluation (Table 8), the most significant adjustment is required by the 
Ministries of Education and Religion; Culture and Sports; and Labour, 
Social Security and Welfare. In most cases, adjustments aimed toward 
the attainment of efficiency lead to a significant decrease in both the 
number of directorates as defined before and after the implementation 
of the AR2013. The significance of the adjustment depends on the 
priorities set by policy makers and consequently by the particular DEA 
programme being applied. 
According to the three DEA programmes (i.e. VRS, Targeted and 
Stochastic), the majority of the CGDs should keep the same number of 
directorates, as they were defined before the implementation of the 
AR2013. Refer to Table 9 in Appendix 
In a reduced sample of twelve CGDs (Table 9), drawing on the results of 
the three DEA programmes, the Ministries that should considerably 
decrease their number of directorates are the Interior, and the Rural 
Development and Food. Significant downward adjustment of the 
number of directorates should also be applied to the Ministry of Culture 
and Sports, the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness, and the 
Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance. Refer to Table 10 
in Appendix 
Table 10 presents the number of sections for the nineteen CGDs before 
and after the implementation of the AR2013. In addition, Table 10 
illustrates the optimal number of sections obtained by the VRS DEA, 
Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes. According to these 
programmes, the most significant reductions to the number of sections 
should be made to the Ministries of Education and Religion, and Culture 
and Sports. Drawing on the results obtained by the VRS DEA and 
Stochastic DEA programmes, the Ministries of Labour, Social Security 
and Welfare, and Rural Development and Food also need to significantly 
adjust their number of sections to achieve efficiency. 
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It should be noted that the Targeted DEA programme identifies less 
restrictive optimal levels for the number of sections of the nineteen 
CGDs compared to the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes. This is 
because the target budget for the CGDs, as determined by the AR2013 
and established as a constraint to the optimisation problem of the 
Targeted DEA programme, is not optimal (minimal). On the contrary, the 
VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA programme define unconstrained optimal 
(minimal) budgets for the CGDs. Further discussion on the effect of 
introducing a target (constraint) in the evaluation follows in Tables 14 
and 15. Refer to Table 11 in Appendix 
In the case of the twelve-CGD sample, the Ministries that need the most 
significant adjustment to their number of sections are the Rural 
Development and Food, the Administrative Reform and E-Governance, 
and the Interior. In addition, the Ministries of Development and 
Competitiveness, and Culture and Sports should also significantly reduce 
the number of their sections. However, there is no consensus among the 
three DEA programmes on such significant reduction for these two 
Ministries. In particular, if a priority for the policy makers is control over 
the spending of the Ministries to the level defined by the AR2013, then 
the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness should reduce its 
sections to 78 from 132, which was the number of sections after the 
implementation of the AR2013. If policy makers admit a possible 
presence of ‘noise’ in the data of the CGDs, then the Ministry of 
Development and Competitiveness should increase the number of its 
sections from 132 to the amount that existed before the implementation 
of the AR2013 (i.e. 257). A similar analysis of the optimal number of 
sections applies to the Ministry of Culture and Sports. 
It should not be ignored that for the majority of the twelve CGDs, the 
number of sections that were operating before the AR2013 is currently 
regarded by the three DEA programmes as the optimal amount. 
However, if the goal of the CGDs is the attainment of efficiency that is 
not restricted at the local level (sample-based efficiency measurement) 
but takes into account a global perspective (population-based efficiency 
estimation), then downward adjustments to the number of sections, 
compared to the number of sections operating before the AR2013, are 
needed. For the CGDs that were assigned the optimal number of 
sections equal to those before the implementation of the AR2013, such 
adjustments will not cause the former levels to be lower than the levels 
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determined after the implementation of the AR2013. Refer to Table 12 
in Appendix 
In Tables 12 and 13, adjustments are being examined which were made 
to the number of tenured staff employed in the nineteen- and twelve-
CGDs samples, respectively, towards the attainment of efficiency. 
Drawing on the results displayed in Table 12, the Ministries that should 
considerably reduce their staff are the Education and Religion, Labour, 
Social Security and Welfare, Culture and Sports, Administrative Reform 
and E-Governance, and the Interior. These significant reductions are 
supported by all three DEA programmes. The Ministry of Rural 
Development and Food should also decrease its number of tenured staff. 
However, this adjustment is supported by the VRS DEA and Stochastic 
DEA programmes while the Targeted DEA programme regards as optimal 
the number of tenured staff in this Ministry before the implementation 
of the AR2013 (i.e. 2155). The most noticeable adjustments for the 
tenured staff, which are directed to the Ministry of Education and 
Religion, and the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare, should 
not be taken into account since the number of staff introduced in the 
DEA programmes included employees who are appointed in 
decentralised offices or distinct public legal entities of the two 
Ministries. As already mentioned (ante, page 25), quite distinct is the 
case of the Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean. Refer to Table 13 in 
Appendix 
Focusing on the reduced sample of twelve CGDs (Table 13), the 
Ministries that should make the most significant modifications to their 
number of staff are the Culture and Sports, Development and 
Competitiveness, Rural Development and Food, Administrative Reform 
and E-Governance, and the Interior. The only Ministry for which there is 
no consensus among the three DEA programmes about the need for a 
decrease in staff is Development and Competitiveness. The remaining 
CGDs, with the exception of the Secretariat General of Information and 
Communication/Secretariat General of Mass Media, which should make 
minor adjustments to its number of employees, should increase their 
number of staff to the levels that were in place before the 
implementation of the AR2013. 
The average reduction of staff in the twelve CGDs that was realised by 
the AR2013 was 4% (Table 14). Based on the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and 
Stochastic DEA programmes, the optimal number of staff would be much 
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lower than the number of staff before the implementation of the 
AR2013. 
Concerning the issue of further reduction of the size of the personnel of 
civil service, it ought to be noted that it results and originates from the 
fact of the primacy and preponderance of financial indicators in the 
assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of public services. If, 
however, a shift of emphasis was attempted —for instance, in the 
reshaping of administrative structures— it is likely that other 
considerations would deserve attention, especially those contributing to 
greater effectiveness, and not simply efficiency or cost reduction (infra, 
pages 35 ff.). Thus, the total size of the civil service personnel, and 
especially its better allocation along the administrative space, might be 
positively affected by transfers and a radical policy of replacements, 
rather than outright dismissals and disbandments. The latter as such can 
hardly be seen as a measure of creative reconstruction of administrative 
performance. 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned significant inconsistency between 
the AR2013 level and the optimal levels for the number of staff of the 
twelve CGDs is not found in other input variables (i.e. general 
directorates, directorates, sections, and budget). It should also be 
pointed out that the 4% cut of the number of staff, which was 
implemented by the AR2013, differs greatly from the reductions in the 
number of general directorates (i.e. -14%), the number of directorates 
(i.e. -36%), the number of sections (i.e. -34%), and the budget (i.e. -15%), 
which were also applied by the AR2013. Refer to Table 14 in Appendix 
Results similar to those in Table 14 are presented in Table 15, which 
refers to the sample of nineteen CGDs. Refer to Table 15 in Appendix 
According to the results presented in Table 16 regarding the optimal 
budget allocated to the nineteen CGDs, the VRS DEA and Stochastic DEA 
programmes identify significant reductions to the budget of the 
Ministries of Rural Development and Food, Culture and Sports, 
Education and Religion, and Labour, Social Security and Welfare. In 
contrast, the VRS DEA programme assigns a higher optimal budget than 
that defined by the AR2013 to eleven of the nineteen CGDs in the 
sample. According to the VRS DEA programme, a significantly higher 
budget than that defined by the AR2013 should be allocated to the 
Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Networks, and the Ministry of Macedonia 
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and Thrace. For these three Ministries, the 2014 budget should have 
remained the same as that of the previous year (i.e. actual budget 
displayed in column 3 of Table 16). It should also be noted that the VRS 
DEA regards the 2013 budget as optimal for 2014 for the Ministry of 
Health. Consequently, the budget reduction introduced by the AR2013 
for this Ministry was unnecessary from the perspective of efficiency. 
The Stochastic DEA programme identifies ten out of the nineteen CGDs 
in the sample that can be allocated a higher budget than that defined by 
the AR2013. The most significant budget increase beyond that defined 
by the AR2013 was found in the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and 
Human Rights, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks, 
and the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace. As in the VRS DEA 
programme, the budget of the Ministry of Health should not have been 
reduced from the 2013 level, since this Ministry was already efficient. 
The Ministry of Health was mentioned due to its crucial role in public 
health and society. In this context, unnecessary budget reductions and 
public health reforms in general are likely to have a significant impact on 
society. Refer to Table 16 in Appendix 
Focusing on the sample of twelve CGDs (Table 17), in order to attain 
efficiency, the Ministries of Rural Development and Food, Culture and 
Sports, and Administrative Reform and E-Governance should 
significantly reduce their budget from the level defined by the AR2013 
and also from the actual level (i.e. 2013 budget). Respecting the criterion 
of efficiency, the VRS DEA programme identifies unnecessary budget 
cuts for half of the sample CGDs, which were decided by the AR2013. 
According to the Stochastic DEA programme, unnecessary budget cuts 
were implemented in seven of the twelve CGDs in the sample (e.g. 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks, Ministry of 
Macedonia and Thrace, Ministry of Tourism). Refer to Table 17 in 
Appendix 
 
4.2. Measurement of effectiveness 
The VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes measure 
efficiency while taking into account only operational variables (i.e. inputs 
and outputs). In the case of implementing an input-oriented strategy 
(i.e. minimisation of resources), the attainment of efficiency is 
associated with control over spending (i.e. economy). 
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The QE-DEA method incorporated both efficiency and users’ perspective 
about the operation of the units under evaluation (e.g. CGDs). Users’ 
perspective is measured by questionnaires. In the case of the CGDs, the 
users who participated in the satisfaction survey were only civil servants. 
There was conducted one independent satisfaction survey for each CGD. 
The surveys were solely directed to civil servants since citizens interact 
not often directly with the ministries, but primarily with their 
decentralised units, and with public bodies and legal entities supervised 
by them (e.g. tax offices, police stations, citizen service centres, 
hospitals), or with local agencies and authorities. 
The determinants of satisfaction that were incorporated in the survey 
were as follows: (i) workload, (ii) professional development, (iii) team 
spirit, (iv) organizational structure, and (v) infrastructure. Users’ 
responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale, which stands for: 
1 – very dissatisfied, 2 – dissatisfied, 3 – neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 
4 – satisfied and 5 – very satisfied. 
According to the results of the users’ satisfaction survey (Table 18), the 
civil servants of any CGD are not satisfied. In particular, there is no 
average satisfaction score at least equal to 4 that denotes satisfaction in 
the five-point Likert scale. The highest satisfaction scores were assigned 
to the Ministry of Health (3.5333), the Ministry of Public Order and 
Citizen’s Protection (3.4667), and the Ministry of Administrative Reform 
and E-Governance (3.2250). The CGDs that were assigned the lowest 
satisfaction scores were the Secretariat General of Information and 
Communication/Secretariat General of Mass Media (1.7500), the 
Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (2.2083), and the 
Ministry of Culture and Sports (2.5500). Refer to Table 18 in Appendix 
The incorporation of users’ perspective in the evaluation of the units is 
crucial for the overall performance of units. The input-oriented VRS DEA, 
Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes regard the outputs (i.e. 
laws) produced by every CGD as fixed. However, focusing on the 
minimisation of inputs while neglecting employees’ morale and 
perception of the work environment may lead to violation of the 
assumption of fixed outputs. In service units, such as the CGDs, 
employees are a fundamental resource for the production process. 
Therefore, omitting employees’ perspective from the evaluation of CGDs 
may lead to infeasible results in practice. It should also be noted that 
users’ perspective is inversely related to efficiency, and thus to economy 
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(De Bruijn, 2007; Sherman and Zhu, 2006a, 2006b; Athanassopoulos, 
1997; Anderson and Fornell, 1994). In this context, the QE-DEA method 
yields ‘balanced’ results, which are regarded as an equilibrium between 
the attainment of efficiency through an input-oriented perspective and 
users’ satisfaction. The levels of inputs defined by the QE-DEA method 
are expected to be less restrictive than those obtained by the VRS DEA, 
Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes. In addition, the levels of 
inputs obtained by the QE-DEA may violate the criterion of economy. 
According to the results of the QE-DEA method, seven out of nineteen 
CGDs need further downward adjustment to their inputs compared to 
those determined by the AR2013 (Tables 19-21). Significant adjustments 
should be made to the Ministry of Education and Religion, the Ministry 
of Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and 
Welfare, the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance, the 
Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Rural Development and 
Food. When the users’ perspective is introduced in the evaluation, a 
significant increase in inputs is needed for several CGDs (e.g. Ministry of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Networks, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of 
Finance) to attain the optimal state, which balances efficiency and 
employees’ satisfaction. Refer to Tables 19, 20, 21 in Appendix  
In the case of the reduced sample of twelve CGDs (Tables 22-24), four 
CGDs should decrease their inputs from the levels determined by 
AR2013 (i.e. Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ministry of Administrative 
Reform and E-Governance, Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 
and Ministry of the Interior). On the contrary, the remaining eight CGDs 
should significantly increase their resources to attain the optimal 
balance between efficiency and employees’ satisfaction. Refer to Tables 
22, 23, 24 in Appendix 
Unlike the VRS DEA, Targeted DEA and Stochastic DEA programmes, the 
QE-DEA method identifies positive average adjustments to the inputs of 
the nineteen and twelve CGDs (Tables 25 and 26). Refer to Tables 25, 26 
in Appendix 
The results of the QE-DEA method, which express a balance between 
efficiency and users’ satisfaction, satisfy the criterion of effectiveness 
and also the mid- to long-run operability of the CGDs. However, the 
results obtained by the QE-DEA methods are not considered to be 
appropriate for short-run strategies, which focus on the attainment of 
efficiency and economy. 
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The attainment of efficiency and effectiveness is a fundamental 
objective of modern public administration (Wisniewski and Olafsson, 
2004; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Kloot and Martin, 2000; OECD, 2003). 
Every DEA method used in this study expresses a different perspective of 
efficiency and effectiveness. The reason behind the multi-perspective 
evaluation process with the application of the different DEA models is 
the cross-check of the reforms suggested and the development of a 
robust plan for the improvement of the operations and structure of the 
nineteen CGDs. 
The DEA methods used for the evaluation of the nineteen Greek CGDs 
differ in scope. The VRS DEA assumes that variable returns to scale 
prevail to the production process of the DMUs. The Targeted DEA 
assumes that for every DMU there is a target value set for one of the 
variables (e.g. budget). The Stochastic DEA assumes the presence of 
‘noise’ in the dataset. The QE-DEA, which is the only one among the four 
DEA methods that measures effectiveness, introduces threshold values 
for exogenous variables (e.g. users’ satisfaction) and considers as 
benchmarks only the DMUs that are simultaneously efficient and meet 
at least the threshold values for the exogenous variables. 
Comparing the results of all of the DEA-based approaches with those of 
the AR2013, it is clear that deviations are present, which reveal the 
difficulty of the AR2013 to lead the CGDs to either efficiency or 
effectiveness. That concurs to the fact that the AR2013 objectives have 
not been fully achieved. It is explicit that the AR2013 is oriented towards 
efficiency and economy rather than effectiveness. However, the AR2013 
fails to attain the goal of efficiency and optimal economy since there is 
room for further adjustments to the resources engaged by the CGDs. As 
a result, the AR2013 could be regarded as a step towards the attainment 
of efficiency and optimal economy, which would be followed by further 
administrative reform frameworks. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The expansion of the organisational layout of ministries could be 
explained, among others, through the gradual increase of citizens’ needs 
during the years or through the effort of the Greek central government 
to respond to funding opportunities. However it was not accompanied 
with the respective reduction of other structures (OECD, 2011: 57). 
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In various parts of this paper an effort was made to study and analyse 
the implications of the CGDs’ reform as far as the capacity and the 
efficiency of the administrative machinery as a whole is concerned. That 
point which was raised by the Memorandum of Understanding, has also 
been a locus classicus among reports of experts in Greek administrative 
literature, as explained in Section 2. In the context of this paper, the 
focus has been placed on the extent that CGDs’ structural configuration 
may affect positively or negatively actual policy design and 
implementation as well as the coordination of CGDs, and improve the 
cohesion and quality of policy making in central government. 
As it was seen in the preceding analysis, the structural reform of CGDs 
that took place by recent reform effort (i.e. AR2013) did indeed produce 
certain results, especially in the reduction of the overall size of central 
ministerial units. The downsizing of the CGDs suggested by the AR2013 
mainly affected the number of directorates and sections, which should 
be reduced by 33% and 29%, respectively. A significantly lower reduction 
of 13% was suggested for the number of general directorates and 
budget of the CGDs. Drawing on the AR2013, the number of staff 
employed at the CGDs should be limited by 3%. The development and 
implementation of the AR2013 needs to serve two of the key objectives 
of the Greek National Reforms Programme (2014): the attainment of 
efficiency and of effectiveness of the Greek public administration. The 
results presented here reveal that the AR2013 leaves much to be desired 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of central government 
administration units. 
This study provided answers to the research questions presented in the 
first Section (i.e. Introduction). By applying three distinct DEA 
programmes, which express three different perspectives of efficiency, 
and a DEA programme for measuring a particular perspective of 
effectiveness (i.e. employees’ perspective of effectiveness), we 
concluded that the AR2013 is regarded as a step toward the 
achievement of efficiency and effectiveness, but can hardly lead the 
Greek CGDs to the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness. For 
instance, drawing on the results obtained by the three DEA programmes, 
the Greek CGDs need to limit the number of their general directorates 
between 23% and 35%, the number of directorates between 22% and 
32%, and the number of sections between 21% and 34%. 
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However, unlike the recommendations of the AR2013 for downsizing all 
of the CGDs, the three DEA programmes identify the need for expansion 
of the organisational structure of some CGDs, such as the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks, and the 
Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change. Expansion of the 
organisational structure and the budget of the CGDs is also suggested by 
the QE-DEA programme, which takes into account the employees’ 
perspective in addition to endogenous operational variables such as 
inputs and outputs. This approach, however, is not likely to be 
considered, as the contraction of the budget of the CGDs is a priority for 
the Greek public administration. 
It comes as no surprise that the recent government change, i.e. the 
succession of the Government of Mr. Ant. Samaras by that of Mr. Al. 
Tsipras, as a result of the general election of 25th January 2015, affected 
seriously the ministerial landscape of central government. The reduction 
of the size, or rather of number of CGDs to ten7 was brought about 
mainly through the formation of respective ‘giant’ departments by 
means of the formal merging of previously independent ministerial 
structures and units of public services in respective areas of public 
policy. 
That option raised in turn once again the issue of the restructuring of the 
ministerial domains in the newly expanded policy areas, which has 
certainly to be reflected in new organisational charts. It can be envisaged 
that this process will be in need of some period of time to be realised 
and finalised. It remains to be seen, however, whether this kind of 
purely formal delimitation of the number of government departments is 
reflected in the necessary adaptation of the corresponding 
organisational structuring (i.e. the composition and reshaping of 
directorates general, directorates, etc.) shown in organisational charts. 
                                                 
7
 1. Ministry of the Interior & Administrative Reconstruction (with three alternate ministers and one 
deputy minister) 
2. Ministry of Economy, Infrastructure, Shipping & Tourism (with three alternate ministers) 
3. Ministry of National Defence (with one alternate minister and one deputy minister) 
4. Ministry of Culture, Education & Religious Affairs (with three alternate ministers and one deputy 
minister) 
5. Ministry of Productive Reconstruction, Environment & Energy (with two alternate ministers and 
one deputy minister) 
6. Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human Rights (with one deputy minister) 
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with two alternate ministers) 
8. Ministry of Finance (with two alternate ministers) 
9. Ministry of Labour, Social Security & Social Solidarity (with three alternate ministers) 
10. Ministry of Health (with one alternate minister). 
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The fact that, alongside the head of each large department, alternate 
ministers were also appointed in almost all government departments is 
evidence of a formalistic rather than substantial reduction of the overall 
size of the government machinery. Following the subsequent 20 
September elections, however, the new Tsipras government has been 
organised in fourteen CGDs,8 seemingly representing something closer 
to the optimal size obtaining in most European countries 
(Makrydemetres and Pravita, 2012: 302 ff.), and respecting more 
faithfully the tradition of Greek politics and governance. 
Despite this reorganisation, however, Law 4336/2015, referring to the 
ratification of the Draft Agreement on the Financial Assistance by the 
European Stability Mechanism regarding the implementation of the 
Financing Agreement, still emphasises the reorganisation of 
administrative structures as one of the basic elements in the strategy for 
reforms in public administration. 
For the reorganisation to take place in more substantial terms in the 
internal environment of the CGDs, attention ought to be paid not only to 
the suggestions of the present analysis, but also to standard rules, 
techniques and principles of applied administrative and management 
science (some of which have been already taken into account). The 
aforementioned general principles of administrative practice do not only 
find support in various textbooks of management science, but they have 
also been identified as necessary standards of administrative 
organisation by repeated rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court 
                                                 
8
 1. Ministry of the Interior & Administrative Reconstruction (with three alternate ministers and two 
deputy ministers) 
2. Ministry of Economy, Development & Tourism (with one alternate minister and two deputy 
ministers) 
3. Ministry of National Defence (with one alternate minister) 
4. Ministry of Education, Research & Religious Affairs (with two alternate ministers and one deputy 
minister) 
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with one alternate minister and two deputy ministers) 
6. Ministry of Justice, Transparency & Human Rights (with one alternate minister) 
7. Ministry of Labour, Social Security & Social Solidarity (with two alternate ministers and one deputy 
minister) 
8. Ministry of Health (with one alternate minister) 
9. Ministry of Culture & Sports (with one deputy minister) 
10. Ministry of Finance (with two alternate ministers) 
11. Ministry of Environment & Energy (with one alternate minister) 
12. Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport & Networks (with one deputy minister) 
13. Ministry of Shipping & Island Policy 
14. Ministry of Rural Development & Food (with one alternate minister). 
The structuring of the government machinery is complemented by the Secretariat General of 
Information and Communication. 
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(the Conseil d’Etat) of the country (Pravita, 2011). It is, therefore, very 
likely that sooner or later drafts of central government structural reform 
reflected in respective organisational charts will be reviewed by the 
Council of State and perhaps be declared void, if and to the extent they 
depart from or violate the above standards and principles of good 
administrative practice. 
Taking account of the above, consideration should be taken in particular 
to the following organisational signposts and criteria, presented here 
indicatively and only for practical purposes, namely, to assist reformers 
who will perhaps be willing to take advantage of them: 
(a) In the novel redrafting of the organisational structure of CGDs 
emphasis should be placed especially on: 
the mission statement concerning the particular ministry in strategic and 
operational terms 
the internal differentiation of administrative services, which ought to 
take place on the basis of standard and vertically integrated units 
the allocation of competences and jurisdictions for the implementation 
of respective areas of public policy that ought to take place in the above 
standard administrative units within the government departments, and 
not outside or alongside them, as it has been usually the practice in the 
past 
similarly, the assignment of personnel posts and positions within the 
above structural cells of central administration ought to reflect and take 
stock of structural management ‘tools’, such as the requisite span of 
control, the unity of direction and unity of command (to name and 
specify just a few of them) 
the qualification and specialism of personnel in terms of job description 
and most certainly specification duties of the heads of section, at least, 
would also need to be reflected and included in the new organisational 
charts of each department of State. 
(b) In the process of allocating functions and jurisdictions between 
central and decentralised ministerial units attention ought to be paid 
especially to the following issues: 
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staff units of central government departments would be advised to 
contain themselves mainly to matters of policy design, strategic 
orientation, coordination, control and evaluation 
subsequently, executive or simply operational activities and 
responsibilities ought to be delegated to decentralised units and 
independent agencies and authorities 
economy and efficiency in central government structural reform entails 
the drastic merger of similar or indistinguishable services and units that 
serve overlapping purposes in the same manner across the 
administrative landscape of central government 
equally necessary is the containment, if not the abolishment, of 
consultative committees and councils, so that the dispersal of 
responsibility is avoided 
the treatment of administrative staff on an equal and objective manner 
regardless of political preferences and affiliations can be stressed as a 
sine qua non condition to move beyond clientelism to a new era of more 
meritocratic management and administration in the central government 
of the State. 
(c) A number of more concrete and specific indications of structural 
reform in central government would perhaps include the following: 
merger of directorates without any staff or with minimal staff 
merger of sections without any staff or with a small number of staff (two 
or three persons) 
merger or abolishment of the multitude of separate or semi-
autonomous units (sections or offices) that are excluded from the 
standard vertical hierarchy of the department and are put under 
immediate control of the political élite of the ministries; they ought, on 
the contrary, to be assimilated in the command structure of the line 
administration of the ministry 
any section and directorate in the new ministerial structuring would 
have to exhibit unity and specificity of direction and orientation 
(management by objectives and qualitative results), so that dispersal 
and overlapping of authority and responsibility is avoided as much as 
possible; in that spirit, no sectional unit would be staffed with less than 
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five to seven persons (civil servants), and no directorate of central 
administration of the government would be comprised of with less than 
five sections 
in each department of central government needs to be set up an 
organisation and methods special unit with staff responsibility to assist 
and encourage line units in the job description and mission statement 
for each post of responsibility; the Ministry of the Interior has to support 
the rest of the ministries in this process, providing them with technical 
support, manuals and material 
the design of a system of amalgamation of the multitude of branches 
and pseudo-specialisms of central government personnel is highly 
advisable as a precondition of breaking up the practice and tradition of 
excessive fragmentation within central government administration of 
the country, also useful in the promoting process of civil servants. 
 
In conclusion, this study tried to meet the research hypotheses that 
were specified in the first Section of the paper. It has also provided 
enough evidence that there is still scope for further reform efforts to 
improve the organisational landscape in the central government along 
the lines suggested in the preceding analysis of the paper. Whether that 
is going to take place in practice, will have to be seen through future 
research and evaluation. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Configuration of the General Government structure 
ID CGDs Inputs  Output 
  General 
Directorates 
  Directorates   Sections   Tenured Staff   Budget   Laws 
    2013 2014   2013 2014   2013 2014   2013 2014   2013 2014   2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8   56 56   175 175   2,004 1,969   308,759,655.00 292,808,000.00   13 
2 FINANCE 16 13   119 73   410 285   15,836 15,156   613,304,369.37 585,185,000.00   22 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 4   15 15   60 60   88,347 87,073   3,321,263,557.79 3,067,296,000.00   14 
4 INTERIOR 6 5   22 14   75 48   654 642   25,783,721.00 30,181,000.00   1 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
14 13   78 36   257 132   1,685 1,683   23,650,714.00 19,387,000.00   4 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 10   57 31   209 115   177,547 171,946   3,885,112,754.78 3,682,781,000.00   4 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6   41 32   177 99   7,563 7,254   334,617,635.87 297,950,000.00   1 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & 
E-GOVERNANCE 
9 5   35 22   139 88   822 803   81,603,046.32 32,998,000.00   2 
9 HEALTH* 5 4   27 19   92 63   86,063 80,833   23,403,726.16 20,841,000.00   6 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
8 7   53 21   161 79   17,150 16,757   512,313,541.14 536,940,000.00   3 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6   49 29   270 105   2,155 2,073   722,813,921.04 506,317,000.00   4 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  
10 9   60 36   160 134   4,597 4,472   774,554,245.30 560,737,000.00   16 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
12 9   58 30   208 110   830 787   70,393,146.00 70,230,000.00   13 
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14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
4 3   13 9   31 31   15,233 15,726   36,781,173.60 25,965,000.00   9 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN'S 
PROTECTION* 
1 1   6 6   25 25   62,722 63,003   1,789,703,384.70 1,742,378,000.00   0 
16 TOURISM 2 2   10 8   30 30   831 778   32,804,872.35 26,966,000.00   4 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 4   27 19   100 71   8,124 8,012   317,228,294.00 295,243,000.00   4 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1   8 4   34 19   132 123   7,038,063.00 5,597,000.00   1 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION / 
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
MASS MEDIA 
2 2   10 5   33 20   449 435   42,952,755.57 41,570,000.00   1 
  Total 134 112   744 465   2,646 1,689   492,744 479,525   12,924,082,576.99 11,841,370,000.00   122 
  OECD average per Ministry 10     60     240                   
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Table 2. Efficiency and effectiveness scores (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Efficiency & Effectiveness scores 
    VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2 FINANCE 1.0000 1.0000 0.8914 1.0000 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
4 INTERIOR 0.4442 0.4597 0.3807 0.6688 
5 DEVELOPMENT & COMPETITIVENESS 0.9223 0.6579 1.0000 1.0000 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 0.1689 0.1678 0.1803 0.2846 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 0.1944 0.4999 0.1643 0.2656 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & E-GOVERNMENT 0.3104 0.3734 0.3357 0.5400 
9 HEALTH* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & WELFARE* 0.2042 0.5097 0.2761 0.3808 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 0.2947 0.9992 0.3807 0.5545 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & HUMAN RIGHTS* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN'S PROTECTION* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
16 TOURISM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 0.3926 0.6419 0.6057 0.7934 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION / SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
MASS MEDIA 
0.9771 1.0000 0.8849 1.0000 
 
Table 3. Efficiency and effectiveness scores (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Efficiency & Effectiveness scores 
  VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
        
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2 FINANSE 1.0000 1.0000 0.9736 1.0000 
3 INTERIOR 0.4442 0.4597 0.3896 0.6688 
4 DEVELOPMENT & COMPETITIVENESS 0.9673 0.8185 1.0000 1.0000 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 0.1951 0.6645 0.1805 0.2663 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    E-GOVERNANCE 0.3104 0.3735 0.3357 0.5400 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 0.2947 0.2947 0.3807 0.5545 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
10 TOURISM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
MASS MEDIA 
0.9771 1.0000 0.8880 1.0000 
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Table 4. Benchmarking (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Benchmarks (IDs) 
    VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 1 1 1 
2 FINANCE 2 2 1, 12, 14, 16 2 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3 3 3 3 
4 INTERIOR 16, 18 18, 19 13, 14, 16 18, 19 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
13, 14, 18 13, 14, 18 5 5 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 14, 15, 16, 18, 3 3, 15, 16, 18 3, 14, 16 3, 14, 18, 19 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 14, 15, 18 3, 12, 18, 19 1, 14, 16 3, 15, 18, 19 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
13, 16, 18 1, 13, 18 13, 16 1, 13, 16, 18 
9 HEALTH* 9 9 9 9 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
16, 18, 3 3, 12 18 1, 14, 16 1, 14, 18 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 1, 13, 16, 18 16, 18 1, 13, 16 1, 16, 19 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
12 12 12 12 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
13 13 13 13 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
14 14 14 14 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
15 15 15 15 
16 TOURISM 16 16 16 16 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 16, 18, 3 3, 12, 16, 18, 19 1, 14, 16 1, 14, 16, 18 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 18 18 18 18 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
16, 18 19 1, 14, 16 19 
 
 
Table 5. Benchmarking (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Benchmarks (IDs) 
    VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 1 1 1 
2 FINANCE 2 2 1, 8, 10 2 
3 INTERIOR 10, 11 11, 12 9, 10 11, 12 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
11, 9 9, 11 4 4 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 11 8, 11, 12 1, 8, 10 11, 12 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & 
E-GOVERNANCE 
10, 11, 9 1, 9, 11 9, 10 1, 9, 10, 11 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & 
FOOD 
1, 10, 11, 9 1, 9, 10, 11 1, 9, 10 1, 10, 12 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  
8 8 8 8 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
9 9 9 9 
10 TOURISM 10 10 10 10 
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11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 11 11 11 11 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
10, 11 12 1, 10 12 
 
 
  61 
Table 6. Optimal number of General Directorates (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs General Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
      Actual   Actual AR2013   Actual AR2013   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00  8 0.00 0.00  8 0.00 0.00  8 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19  16 0.00 0.23  16 0.00 0.23  13 -0.19 0.00 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 4 0.00  4 0.00 0.00  4 0.00 0.00  4 0.00 0.00 
4 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17  1 -0.83 -0.80  2 -0.67 -0.60  2 -0.67 -0.60 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
14 13 -0.07  3 -0.79 -0.77  4 -0.71 -0.69  14 0.00 0.08 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 10 -0.09  2 -0.82 -0.80  2 -0.82 -0.80  2 -0.82 -0.80 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14  1 -0.86 -0.83  3 -0.57 -0.50  1 -0.86 -0.83 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
9 5 -0.44  2 -0.78 -0.60  2 -0.78 -0.60  2 -0.78 -0.60 
9 HEALTH* 5 4 -0.20  5 0.00 0.25  5 0.00 0.25  5 0.00 0.25 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
8 7 -0.13  2 -0.75 -0.71  4 -0.50 -0.43  2 -0.75 -0.71 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33  3 -0.67 -0.50  9 0.00 0.50  3 -0.67 -0.50 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
10 9 -0.10  10 0.00 0.11  10 0.00 0.11  10 0.00 0.11 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
12 9 -0.25  12 0.00 0.33  12 0.00 0.33  12 0.00 0.33 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
4 3 -0.25  4 0.00 0.33  4 0.00 0.33  4 0.00 0.33 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
1 1 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00 
16 TOURISM 2 2 0.00  2 0.00 0.00  2 0.00 0.00  2 0.00 0.00 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 4 -0.20  2 -0.60 -0.50  3 -0.40 -0.25  2 -0.60 -0.50 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 2 2 0.00  1 -0.50 -0.50  2 0.00 0.00  1 -0.50 -0.50 
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INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
 
 
Table 7. Optimal number of General Directorates (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs General Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
       Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00  8 0.00 0.00  8 0.00 0.00  8 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19  16 0.00 0.23  16 0.00 0.23  14 -0.13 0.08 
3 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17  1 -0.83 -0.80  2 -0.67 -0.60  2 -0.67 -0.60 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
14 13 -0.07  4 -0.71 -0.69  4 -0.71 -0.69  14 0.00 0.08 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14  1 -0.86 -0.83  5 -0.29 -0.17  1 -0.86 -0.83 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
9 5 -0.44  2 -0.78 -0.60  2 -0.78 -0.60  2 -0.78 -0.60 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33  3 -0.67 -0.50  3 -0.67 -0.50  3 -0.67 -0.50 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
10 9 -0.10  10 0.00 0.11  10 0.00 0.11  10 0.00 0.11 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
12 9 -0.25  12 0.00 0.33  12 0.00 0.33  12 0.00 0.33 
10 TOURISM 2 2 0.00  2 0.00 0.00  2 0.00 0.00  2 0.00 0.00 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00  1 0.00 0.00 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
2 2 0.00  1 -0.50 -0.50  2 0.00 0.00  1 -0.50 -0.50 
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Table 8. Optimal number of Directorates (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
       Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 56 0.00  56 0.00 0.00  56 0.00 0.00  56 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 119 73 -0.39  119 0.00 0.63  119 0.00 0.63  74 -0.38 0.01 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 15 15 0.00  15 0.00 0.00  15 0.00 0.00  15 0.00 0.00 
4 INTERIOR 22 14 -0.36  8 -0.64 -0.43  9 -0.59 -0.36  8 -0.64 -0.43 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
78 36 -0.54  18 -0.77 -0.50  19 -0.76 -0.47  78 0.00 1.17 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 57 31 -0.46  10 -0.82 -0.68  10 -0.82 -0.68  6 -0.89 -0.81 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 41 32 -0.22  8 -0.80 -0.75  20 -0.51 -0.38  5 -0.88 -0.84 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
35 22 -0.37  11 -0.69 -0.50  13 -0.63 -0.41  11 -0.69 -0.50 
9 HEALTH* 27 19 -0.30  27 0.00 0.42  27 0.00 0.42  27 0.00 0.42 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
53 21 -0.60  9 -0.83 -0.57  25 -0.53 0.19  8 -0.85 -0.62 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 49 29 -0.41  14 -0.71 -0.52  49 0.00 0.69  18 -0.63 -0.38 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
60 36 -0.40  60 0.00 0.67  60 0.00 0.67  60 0.00 0.67 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
58 30 -0.48  58 0.00 0.93  58 0.00 0.93  58 0.00 0.93 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
13 9 -0.31  13 0.00 0.44  13 0.00 0.44  13 0.00 0.44 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
6 6 0.00  6 0.00 0.00  6 0.00 0.00  6 0.00 0.00 
16 TOURISM 10 8 -0.20  10 0.00 0.25  10 0.00 0.25  10 0.00 0.25 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 27 19 -0.30  10 -0.63 -0.47  17 -0.37 -0.11  11 -0.59 -0.42 
  64 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 8 4 -0.50  8 0.00 1.00  8 0.00 1.00  8 0.00 1.00 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
10 5 -0.50  9 -0.10 0.80  10 0.00 1.00  6 -0.40 0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Optimal number of Directorates (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 56 0.00  56 0.00 0.00  56 0.00 0.00  56 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 119 73 -0.39  119 0.00 0.63  119 0.00 0.63  91 -0.24 0.25 
3 INTERIOR 22 14 -0.36  8 -0.64 -0.43  9 -0.59 -0.36  8 -0.64 -0.43 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
78 36 -0.54  21 -0.73 -0.42  21 -0.73 -0.42  78 0.00 1.17 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 41 32 -0.22  8 -0.80 -0.75  27 -0.34 -0.16  7 -0.83 -0.78 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM &                      
E-GOVERNANCE 
35 22 -0.37  11 -0.69 -0.50  13 -0.63 -0.41  11 -0.69 -0.50 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
& FOOD 
49 29 -0.41  14 -0.71 -0.52  14 -0.71 -0.52  18 -0.63 -0.38 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & 
NETWORKS  
60 36 -0.40  60 0.00 0.67  60 0.00 0.67  60 0.00 0.67 
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9 ENVIRONMENT, 
ENERGY & CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
58 30 -0.48  58 0.00 0.93  58 0.00 0.93  58 0.00 0.93 
10 TOURISM 10 8 -0.20  10 0.00 0.25  10 0.00 0.25  10 0.00 0.25 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 8 4 -0.50  8 0.00 1.00  8 0.00 1.00  8 0.00 1.00 
12 SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/ 
SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS 
MEDIA 
10 5 -0.50  9 -0.10 0.80  10 0.00 1.00  5 -0.50 0.00 
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Table 10. Optimal number of Sections (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Sections 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00  175 0.00 0.00  175 0.00 0.00  175 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30  410 0.00 0.44  410 0.00 0.44  214 -0.48 -0.25 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 60 60 0.00  60 0.00 0.00  60 0.00 0.00  60 0.00 0.00 
4 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36  33 -0.56 -0.31  34 -0.55 -0.29  28 -0.63 -0.42 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
257 132 -0.49  67 -0.74 -0.49  71 -0.72 -0.46  257 0.00 0.95 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 209 115 -0.45  35 -0.83 -0.70  35 -0.83 -0.70  19 -0.91 -0.83 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44  34 -0.81 -0.66  88 -0.50 -0.11  16 -0.91 -0.84 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
& E-GOVERNANCE 
139 88 -0.37  43 -0.69 -0.51  52 -0.63 -0.41  40 -0.71 -0.55 
9 HEALTH* 92 63 -0.32  92 0.00 0.46  92 0.00 0.46  92 0.00 0.46 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL 
SECURITY & WELFARE* 
161 79 -0.51  32 -0.80 -0.59  82 -0.49 0.04  21 -0.87 -0.73 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & 
FOOD 
270 105 -0.61  50 -0.81 -0.52  270 0.00 1.57  57 -0.79 -0.46 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS 
160 134 -0.16  160 0.00 0.19  160 0.00 0.19  160 0.00 0.19 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
208 110 -0.47  208 0.00 0.89  208 0.00 0.89  208 0.00 0.89 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY 
& HUMAN RIGHTS* 
31 31 0.00  31 0.00 0.00  31 0.00 0.00  31 0.00 0.00 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
25 25 0.00  25 0.00 0.00  25 0.00 0.00  25 0.00 0.00 
16 TOURISM 30 30 0.00  30 0.00 0.00  30 0.00 0.00  30 0.00 0.00 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 100 71 -0.29  31 -0.69 -0.56  64 -0.36 -0.10  32 -0.68 -0.55 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44  34 0.00 0.79  34 0.00 0.79  34 0.00 0.79 
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19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
33 20 -0.39  32 -0.03 0.60  33 0.00 0.65  17 -0.48 -0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Optimal number of Sections (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Sections 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00  175 0.00 0.00  175 0.00 0.00  175 0.00 0.00 
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30  410 0.00 0.44  410 0.00 0.44  276 -0.33 -0.03 
3 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36  33 -0.56 -0.31  34 -0.55 -0.29  29 -0.61 -0.40 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
257 132 -0.49  78 -0.70 -0.41  78 -0.70 -0.41  257 0.00 0.95 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44  34 -0.81 -0.66  118 -0.33 0.19  20 -0.89 -0.80 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM &                        
E-GOVERNANCE 
139 88 -0.37  43 -0.69 -0.51  52 -0.63 -0.41  40 -0.71 -0.55 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
& FOOD 
270 105 -0.61  50 -0.81 -0.52  50 -0.81 -0.52  57 -0.79 -0.46 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & 
NETWORKS  
160 134 -0.16  160 0.00 0.19  160 0.00 0.19  160 0.00 0.19 
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9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY 
& CLIMATE CHANGE 
208 110 -0.47  208 0.00 0.89  208 0.00 0.89  208 0.00 0.89 
10 TOURISM 30 30 0.00  30 0.00 0.00  30 0.00 0.00  30 0.00 0.00 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44  34 0.00 0.79  34 0.00 0.79  34 0.00 0.79 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL 
OF INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/ 
SECRETARIAT GENERAL 
OF MASS MEDIA 
33 20 -0.39  32 -0.03 0.60  33 0.00 0.65  17 -0.48 -0.15 
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Table 12. Optimal number of Staff (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Staff 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2004 1969 -0.02  2004 0.00 0.02  2004 0.00 0.02  2004 0.00 0.02 
2 FINANCE 15836 15156 -0.04  15836 0.00 0.04  15836 0.00 0.04  14114 -0.11 -0.07 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 88347 87073 -0.01  88347 0.00 0.01  88347 0.00 0.01  88347 0.00 0.01 
4 INTERIOR 654 642 -0.02  252 -0.61 -0.61  301 -0.54 -0.53  249 -0.62 -0.61 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
1685 1683 0.00  1554 -0.08 -0.08  1109 -0.34 -0.34  1685 0.00 0.00 
6 EDUCATION & 
RELIGION* 
177547 171946 -0.03  19372 -0.89 -0.89  22297 -0.87 -0.87  21649 -0.88 -0.87 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7563 7254 -0.04  1470 -0.81 -0.80  3781 -0.50 -0.48  1243 -0.84 -0.83 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM &                     
E-GOVERNANCE 
822 803 -0.02  255 -0.69 -0.68  307 -0.63 -0.62  276 -0.66 -0.66 
9 HEALTH* 86063 80833 -0.06  86063 0.00 0.06  86063 0.00 0.06  86063 0.00 0.06 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL 
SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
17150 16757 -0.02  2736 -0.84 -0.84  8741 -0.49 -0.48  4734 -0.72 -0.72 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
& FOOD 
2155 2073 -0.04  635 -0.71 -0.69  2153 0.00 0.04  820 -0.62 -0.60 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & 
NETWORKS 
4597 4472 -0.03  4597 0.00 0.03  4597 0.00 0.03  4597 0.00 0.03 
13 ENVIRONMENT, 
ENERGY & CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
830 787 -0.05  830 0.00 0.05  830 0.00 0.05  830 0.00 0.05 
14 JUSTICE, 
TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
15233 15726 0.03  15233 0.00 -0.03  15233 0.00 -0.03  15233 0.00 -0.03 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & 62722 63003 0.00  62722 0.00 0.00  62722 0.00 0.00  62722 0.00 0.00 
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CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
16 TOURISM 831 778 -0.06  831 0.00 0.07  831 0.00 0.07  831 0.00 0.07 
17 SHIPPING & THE 
AEGEAN* 
8124 8012 -0.01  3190 -0.61 -0.60  5215 -0.36 -0.35  4920 -0.39 -0.39 
18 MACEDONIA & 
THRACE 
132 123 -0.07  132 0.00 0.07  132 0.00 0.07  132 0.00 0.07 
19 SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & COM-
MUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
449 435 -0.03  439 -0.02 0.01  449 0.00 0.03  397 -0.12 -0.09 
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Table 13. Optimal number of Staff (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Staff 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2004 1969 -0.02  2004 0.00 0.02  2004 0.00 0.02  2004 0.00 0.02 
2 FINANCE 15836 15156 -0.04  15836 0.00 0.04  15836 0.00 0.04  4446 -0.72 -0.71 
3 INTERIOR 654 642 -0.02  252 -0.61 -0.61  301 -0.54 -0.53  124 -0.81 -0.81 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
1685 1683 0.00  307 -0.82 -0.82  307 -0.82 -0.82  1685 0.00 0.00 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7563 7254 -0.04  132 -0.98 -0.98  1388 -0.82 -0.81  383 -0.95 -0.95 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM &                      
E-GOVERNANCE 
822 803 -0.02  255 -0.69 -0.68  307 -0.63 -0.62  276 -0.66 -0.66 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
& FOOD 
2155 2073 -0.04  635 -0.71 -0.69  635 -0.71 -0.69  820 -0.62 -0.60 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & 
NETWORKS  
4597 4472 -0.03  4597 0.00 0.03  4597 0.00 0.03  4597 0.00 0.03 
9 ENVIRONMENT, 
ENERGY & CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
830 787 -0.05  830 0.00 0.05  830 0.00 0.05  830 0.00 0.05 
10 TOURISM 831 778 -0.06  831 0.00 0.07  831 0.00 0.07  831 0.00 0.07 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 132 123 -0.07  132 0.00 0.07  132 0.00 0.07  132 0.00 0.07 
12 SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/ 
SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS 
MEDIA 
449 435 -0.03  439 -0.02 0.01  449 0.00 0.03  365 -0.19 -0.16 
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Table 14. Average change of inputs before and after the adjustments 
(12 Central Government Departments) 
Inputs Change 
  AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic 
General Directorates -0.14 -0.36 -0.26 -0.30 
Directorates -0.36 -0.31 -0.25 -0.29 
Sections -0.34 -0.30 -0.25 -0.32 
Staff -0.04 -0.32 -0.29 -0.33 
Budget -0.15 -0.33 -0.15 -0.30 
 
 
Table 15. Average change of inputs before and after the adjustments  
(19 Central Government Departments) 
Inputs Change 
  AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic 
General Directorates -0.13 -0.35 -0.23 -0.31 
Directorates -0.33 -0.32 -0.22 -0.31 
Sections -0.29 -0.31 -0.21 -0.34 
Staff -0.03 -0.28 -0.20 -0.26 
Budget -0.13 -0.32 -0.13 -0.34 
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Table 16. Optimal Budget (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Budget 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05  308759655 0.00 0.05  292808000 -0.05 0.00  308759655 0.00 0.05 
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05  613304369 0.00 0.05  585185000 -0.05 0.00  538733747 -0.12 -0.08 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3321263558 3067296000 -0.08  3321263558 0.00 0.08  3067296000 -0.08 0.00  3321263556 0.00 0.08 
4 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17  11453002 -0.56 -0.62  30181000 0.17 0.00  9816658 -0.62 -0.67 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
23650714 19387000 -0.18  21811921 -0.08 0.13  19387000 -0.18 0.00  23650714 0.00 0.22 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3885112755 3682781000 -0.05  656002291 -0.83 -0.82  3682781000 -0.05 0.00  700595199 -0.82 -0.81 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11  44121179 -0.87 -0.85  297950000 -0.11 0.00  24002146 -0.93 -0.92 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
81603046.3 32998000 -0.60  13548212 -0.83 -0.59  32998000 -0.60 0.00  17223636 -0.79 -0.48 
9 HEALTH* 23403726.2 20841000 -0.11  23403726 0.00 0.12  20841000 -0.11 0.00  23403726 0.00 0.12 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
512313541 536940000 0.05  104589111 -0.80 -0.81  536940000 0.05 0.00  27006497 -0.95 -0.95 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30  34269389 -0.95 -0.93  506317000 -0.30 0.00  84693214 -0.88 -0.83 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
774554245 560737000 -0.28  774554245 0.00 0.38  560737000 -0.28 0.00  774554244 0.00 0.38 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
70393146 70230000 0.00  70393146 0.00 0.00  70230000 0.00 0.00  70393146 0.00 0.00 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
36781173.6 25965000 -0.29  36781174 0.00 0.42  25965000 -0.29 0.00  36781174 0.00 0.42 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
1789703385 1742378000 -0.03  1789703385 0.00 0.03  1742378000 -0.03 0.00  1789703383 0.00 0.03 
16 TOURISM 32804872.4 26966000 -0.18  32804872 0.00 0.22  26966000 -0.18 0.00  32804872 0.00 0.22 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 317228294 295243000 -0.07  121477126 -0.62 -0.59  295243000 -0.07 0.00  44990368 -0.86 -0.85 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20  7038063 0.00 0.26  5597000 -0.20 0.00  7038063 0.00 0.26 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 42952755.6 41570000 -0.03  18344659 -0.57 -0.56  41570000 -0.03 0.00  23213683 -0.46 -0.44 
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INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
 
 
 
Table 17. Optimal Budget (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Budget 
    Actual AR2013 Change  VRS Change  Targeted Change  Stochastic Change 
        Actual    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013    Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05  308759655 0.00 0.05  292808000 -0.05 0.00  308759655 0.00 0.05 
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05  613304369 0.00 0.05  585185000 -0.05 0.00  597115698 -0.03 0.02 
3 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17  11453002 -0.56 -0.62  30181000 0.17 0.00  10044113 -0.61 -0.67 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
23650714 19387000 -0.18  22876834 -0.03 0.18  19387000 -0.18 0.00  23650714 0.00 0.22 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11  7038063 -0.98 -0.98  297950000 -0.11 0.00  48611514 -0.85 -0.84 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
81603046 32998000 -0.60  13548212 -0.83 -0.59  32998000 -0.60 0.00  17223636 -0.79 -0.48 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30  34269389 -0.95 -0.93  506317000 -0.30 0.00  84693214 -0.88 -0.83 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
774554245 560737000 -0.28  774554245 0.00 0.38  560737000 -0.28 0.00  774554244 0.00 0.38 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
70393146 70230000 0.00  70393146 0.00 0.00  70230000 0.00 0.00  70393146 0.00 0.00 
10 TOURISM 32804872 26966000 -0.18  32804872 0.00 0.22  26966000 -0.18 0.00  32804872 0.00 0.22 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20  7038063 0.00 0.26  5597000 -0.20 0.00  7038063 0.00 0.26 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
42952756 41570000 -0.03  18344659 -0.57 -0.56  41570000 -0.03 0.00  22386450 -0.48 -0.46 
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Table 18. Employees’ satisfaction scores 
ID CGDs Satisfaction determinants Average 
    Workload Professional  
development 
Team  
spirit 
Organisational  
structure 
Infrastructure   
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 3.4444 2.6667 3.3333 2.6667 3.5000 3.1222 
2 FINANCE 3.3590 1.9615 3.1731 2.6154 2.8846 2.7987 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3.0000 1.7500 3.3333 2.5000 2.8333 2.6833 
4 INTERIOR 3.3030 1.9773 3.4318 2.7727 2.5909 2.8152 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
2.7500 2.3125 3.7500 2.6250 3.5000 2.9875 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3.2500 2.0417 3.2917 2.2083 3.2500 2.8083 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 2.5000 1.7500 3.0000 2.7500 2.7500 2.5500 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &     
E-GOVERNANCE 
3.5000 2.2500 3.3750 2.9167 4.0833 3.2250 
9 HEALTH* 4.6667 1.7500 4.2500 3.0000 4.0000 3.5333 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
3.3333 2.2500 3.4167 3.1667 2.5000 2.9333 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 3.6667 2.6250 3.5000 2.7500 3.5000 3.2083 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
3.3333 1.6667 3.2500 3.3333 3.8333 3.0833 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
2.1667 1.2500 3.6250 1.0000 3.0000 2.2083 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
2.7778 1.5000 3.6667 2.1667 3.0000 2.6222 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
3.8333 2.8750 4.1250 3.0000 3.5000 3.4667 
16 TOURISM 3.0000 1.5000 3.0000 2.5000 1.0000 2.2000 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 3.6667 2.3333 2.8333 2.6667 3.5000 3.0000 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 3.6667 1.5000 3.5000 1.0000 5.0000 2.9333 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
3.0000 2.7500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.7500 
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Table 19. QE-DEA optimal number of General Directorates and Directorates (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs General Directorates  Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change  Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013      Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 12 0.50 0.50  56 56 0.00 82 0.46 0.46 
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 27 0.69 1.08  119 73 -0.39 201 0.69 1.75 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 4 4 0.00 7 0.75 0.75  15 15 0.00 27 0.80 0.80 
4 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 2 -0.67 -0.60  22 14 -0.36 12 -0.45 -0.14 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
14 13 -0.07 14 0.00 0.08  78 36 -0.54 78 0.00 1.17 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 11 10 -0.09 3 -0.73 -0.70  57 31 -0.46 16 -0.72 -0.48 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 2 -0.71 -0.67  41 32 -0.22 11 -0.73 -0.66 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
9 5 -0.44 3 -0.67 -0.40  35 22 -0.37 19 -0.46 -0.14 
9 HEALTH* 5 4 -0.20 6 0.20 0.50  27 19 -0.30 33 0.22 0.74 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
8 7 -0.13 3 -0.63 -0.57  53 21 -0.60 16 -0.70 -0.24 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 9 6 -0.33 4 -0.56 -0.33  49 29 -0.41 27 -0.45 -0.07 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
10 9 -0.10 15 0.50 0.67  60 36 -0.40 90 0.50 1.50 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
12 9 -0.25 27 1.25 2.00  58 30 -0.48 129 1.22 3.30 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
4 3 -0.25 7 0.75 1.33  13 9 -0.31 24 0.85 1.67 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.00  6 6 0.00 8 0.33 0.33 
16 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 4 1.00 1.00  10 8 -0.20 22 1.20 1.75 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 5 4 -0.20 4 -0.20 0.00  27 19 -0.30 21 -0.22 0.11 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 2 1.00 1.00  8 4 -0.50 13 0.63 2.25 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00  10 5 -0.50 10 0.00 1.00 
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COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. QE-DEA optimal number of Sections and Staff (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Sections  Staff 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change  Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013      Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 257 0.47 0.47  2004 1969 -0.02 2946 0.47 0.50 
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 693 0.69 1.43  15836 15156 -0.04 26756 0.69 0.77 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 60 60 0.00 107 0.78 0.78  88347 87073 -0.01 157044 0.78 0.80 
4 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 50 -0.33 0.04  654 642 -0.02 256 -0.61 -0.60 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
257 132 -0.49 257 0.00 0.95  1685 1683 0.00 1685 0.00 0.00 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 209 115 -0.45 59 -0.72 -0.49  177547 171946 -0.03 31202 -0.82 -0.82 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 40 -0.77 -0.60  7563 7254 -0.04 2009 -0.73 -0.72 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
139 88 -0.37 73 -0.47 -0.17  822 803 -0.02 444 -0.46 -0.45 
9 HEALTH* 92 63 -0.32 113 0.23 0.79  86063 80833 -0.06 106142 0.23 0.31 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
161 79 -0.51 58 -0.64 -0.27  17150 16757 -0.02 6530 -0.62 -0.61 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 270 105 -0.61 86 -0.68 -0.18  2155 2073 -0.04 1195 -0.45 -0.42 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
160 134 -0.16 239 0.49 0.78  4597 4472 -0.03 6871 0.49 0.54 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
208 110 -0.47 461 1.22 3.19  830 787 -0.05 1841 1.22 1.34 
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14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
31 31 0.00 57 0.84 0.84  15233 15726 0.03 27827 0.83 0.77 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
25 25 0.00 32 0.28 0.28  62722 63003 0.00 79609 0.27 0.26 
16 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 67 1.23 1.23  831 778 -0.06 1851 1.23 1.38 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 100 71 -0.29 71 -0.29 0.00  8124 8012 -0.01 6446 -0.21 -0.20 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 54 0.59 1.84  132 123 -0.07 210 0.59 0.71 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
33 20 -0.39 33 0.00 0.65  449 435 -0.03 449 0.00 0.03 
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Table 21. QE-DEA optimal Budget (19 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Budget 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 453883932.2 0.47 0.55 
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 1036201555 0.69 0.77 
3 NATIONAL DEFENCE* 3321263558 3067296000 -0.08 5903818073 0.78 0.92 
4 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 17245299.43 -0.33 -0.43 
5 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
23650714 19387000 -0.18 23650714 0.00 0.22 
6 EDUCATION & RELIGION* 3885112755 3682781000 -0.05 1105695473 -0.72 -0.70 
7 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 80591940.58 -0.76 -0.73 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
81603046.3 32998000 -0.60 44062582.65 -0.46 0.34 
9 HEALTH* 23403726.2 20841000 -0.11 28863914.36 0.23 0.38 
10 LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY & 
WELFARE* 
512313541 536940000 0.05 30626639.68 -0.94 -0.94 
11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 134321651.1 -0.81 -0.73 
12 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
774554245 560737000 -0.28 1157641808 0.49 1.06 
13 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
70393146 70230000 0.00 156176483.4 1.22 1.22 
14 JUSTICE, TRANSPARENCY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS* 
36781173.6 25965000 -0.29 67189192.44 0.83 1.59 
15 PUBLIC ORDER & CITIZEN’S 
PROTECTION* 
1789703385 1742378000 -0.03 2271562587 0.27 0.30 
16 TOURISM 32804872.4 26966000 -0.18 73083495.87 1.23 1.71 
17 SHIPPING & THE AEGEAN* 317228294 295243000 -0.07 63676031.57 -0.80 -0.78 
18 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 11217027.52 0.59 1.00 
19 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
42952755.6 41570000 -0.03 42952755.57 0.00 0.03 
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Table 22. QE-DEA optimal number of General Directorates and Directorates (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs General Directorates  Directorates 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change  Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013      Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 8 0.00 12 0.50 0.50  56 56 0.00 82 0.46 0.46 
2 FINANCE 16 13 -0.19 27 0.69 1.08  119 73 -0.39 201 0.69 1.75 
3 INTERIOR 6 5 -0.17 2 -0.67 -0.60  22 14 -0.36 12 -0.45 -0.14 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
14 13 -0.07 14 0.00 0.08  78 36 -0.54 78 0.00 1.17 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 7 6 -0.14 2 -0.71 -0.67  41 32 -0.22 11 -0.73 -0.66 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & 
E-GOVERNANCE 
9 5 -0.44 3 -0.67 -0.40  35 22 -0.37 19 -0.46 -0.14 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & 
FOOD 
9 6 -0.33 4 -0.56 -0.33  49 29 -0.41 27 -0.45 -0.07 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  
10 9 -0.10 15 0.50 0.67  60 36 -0.40 90 0.50 1.50 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
12 9 -0.25 27 1.25 2.00  58 30 -0.48 129 1.22 3.30 
10 TOURISM 2 2 0.00 4 1.00 1.00  10 8 -0.20 22 1.20 1.75 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 1 1 0.00 2 1.00 1.00  8 4 -0.50 13 0.63 2.25 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/ 
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
MASS MEDIA 
2 2 0.00 2 0.00 0.00  10 5 -0.50 10 0.00 1.00 
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Table 23. QE-DEA optimal number of Sections and Staff (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Sections  Staff 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change  Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013      Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 175 175 0.00 257 0.47 0.47  2004 1969 -0.02 2946 0.47 0.50 
2 FINANCE 410 285 -0.30 693 0.69 1.43  15836 15156 -0.04 26756 0.69 0.77 
3 INTERIOR 75 48 -0.36 50 -0.33 0.04  654 642 -0.02 256 -0.61 -0.60 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
257 132 -0.49 257 0.00 0.95  1685 1683 0.00 1685 0.00 0.00 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 177 99 -0.44 40 -0.77 -0.60  7563 7254 -0.04 2009 -0.73 -0.72 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM & 
E-GOVERNANCE 
139 88 -0.37 73 -0.47 -0.17  822 803 -0.02 444 -0.46 -0.45 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & 
FOOD 
270 105 -0.61 86 -0.68 -0.18  2155 2073 -0.04 1195 -0.45 -0.42 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, 
TRANSPORT & NETWORKS  
160 134 -0.16 239 0.49 0.78  4597 4472 -0.03 6871 0.49 0.54 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
208 110 -0.47 461 1.22 3.19  830 787 -0.05 1841 1.22 1.34 
10 TOURISM 30 30 0.00 67 1.23 1.23  831 778 -0.06 1851 1.23 1.38 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 34 19 -0.44 54 0.59 1.84  132 123 -0.07 210 0.59 0.71 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/ 
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
MASS MEDIA 
33 20 -0.39 33 0.00 0.65  449 435 -0.03 449 0.00 0.03 
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Table 24. QE-DEA optimal Budget (12 Central Government Departments) 
ID CGDs Budget 
    Actual AR2013 Change QE-DEA Change 
        Actual   Actual AR2013 
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308759655 292808000 -0.05 453883932 0.47 0.55 
2 FINANCE 613304369 585185000 -0.05 1036201555 0.69 0.77 
3 INTERIOR 25783721 30181000 0.17 17245299.4 -0.33 -0.43 
4 DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETITIVENESS 
23650714 19387000 -0.18 23650714 0.00 0.22 
5 CULTURE & SPORTS 334617636 297950000 -0.11 80591940.6 -0.76 -0.73 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM &    
E-GOVERNANCE 
81603046 32998000 -0.60 44062582.7 -0.46 0.34 
7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT & FOOD 722813921 506317000 -0.30 134321651 -0.81 -0.73 
8 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT 
& NETWORKS  
774554245 560737000 -0.28 1157641808 0.49 1.06 
9 ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
70393146 70230000 0.00 156176483 1.22 1.22 
10 TOURISM 32804872 26966000 -0.18 73083495.9 1.23 1.71 
11 MACEDONIA & THRACE 7038063 5597000 -0.20 11217027.5 0.59 1.00 
12 SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF 
INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATION/SECRETARIAT 
GENERAL OF MASS MEDIA 
42952756 41570000 -0.03 42952755.6 0.00 0.03 
 
 
 
 
Table 25. Average change of inputs for the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness         
(19 Central Government Departments) 
Inputs Change 
  AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
General Directorates -0.13 -0.35 -0.23 -0.31 0.13 
Directorates -0.33 -0.32 -0.22 -0.31 0.17 
Sections -0.29 -0.31 -0.21 -0.34 0.15 
Staff -0.03 -0.28 -0.20 -0.26 0.15 
Budget -0.13 -0.32 -0.13 -0.34 0.10 
 
 
Table 26. Average change of inputs for the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness         
(12 Central Government Departments) 
Inputs Change 
  AR2013 VRS Targeted Stochastic QE-DEA 
General Directorates -0.14 -0.36 -0.26 -0.30 0.19 
Directorates -0.36 -0.31 -0.25 -0.29 0.22 
Sections -0.34 -0.30 -0.25 -0.32 0.20 
Staff -0.04 -0.32 -0.29 -0.33 0.20 
Budget -0.15 -0.33 -0.15 -0.30 0.19 
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